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In this thesis I address certain central aspects of the relations between what I define as different 
parties within the Bidi Bidi refugee camp. Based on fieldwork in and around the camp in 2019, 
I have analytically separated these parties into three as I see these as fundamentally striving 
towards different aims and, crucially, also often oppose each other, openly or covertly. In my 
analysis the humanitarian organisations and the Ugandan government comprise one party. The 
refugees and the local population constitute the two others. In my thesis I argue that the relations 
between these three parties are fundamentally driven or shaped by acts of resistance within a 
triangulated form of power relation. Furthermore, as I present the different parties it becomes 
evident that the humanitarian organisations and the Ugandan government comprise the most 
powerful party in the triangle, causing its shape to be lopsided rather than even. My 
triangulation, therefore, does not imply a horizontalization of relations but, rather, seeks outline 
also vertical relations of power. Concretely, I argue that the Ugandan government and the 
humanitarian organizations maintain this powerful role by controlling different forms of 
distribution, and being in charge of food, supplying jobs and giving courses. Through these 
practices they also produce various forms of governmentality which is supposed to make the 
refugees able to govern themselves the way the humanitarian organisations and the Ugandan 
government want. Throughout the thesis I also present multiple cases of both open and hidden 
forms of resistance by all three actors. I argue that even the humanitarian organisations and the 
Ugandan government are acting resistant towards the other parties through both acts of 
governing and disregarding acts committed by the other parties. I argue that, analytically, it is 
illuminating to see all these acts as resistant as it is the power of an actor that is resisted. The 
main party these acts effect are the refugees. I further argue, based on hospitality theory in 
anthropology, that despite the power of the Ugandan state and the humanitarian organizations, 
the de facto host community are still the main host in the everyday life in the camp. Crucially, 
they also practice both hospitality and resistance and, again, the one does not exclude the other. 
I then further argue that these resistant acts between the parties are the relations defining feature 
and, in this way, describes the relation between the parties well. With this argument I wish to 
argue that refugees can be empowered and that they don’t have to be treated as they are in many 
countries. Looking closer at the relations between the parties, I believe it can be possible to find 
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Presenting the power triangle 
 
While sitting with the whole family around the shared plate between our six houses eating 
dinner— which, as always, is maize and beans— I hear a man's voice in a megaphone saying 
something in Juba Arabic and Kakwa. I ask the others what he said, and they tell me that he 
announced that they will start handing out food tomorrow at nine AM, starting with household 
size six (groups of houses having six people in them). We all finish our meal and sit around 
talking under the moon above with only a small light bulb connected to a solar battery as light. 
Someone picks up a phone which is able to show some funny videos or a game and we all crowd 
in front. The insects are swarming around the lightbulb hanging four meters away in a pole 
making a constant humming sound. 
 
The next day at nine AM, the only people at the distribution point are people who are getting 
water from the nearby water point. The distribution point is a large open area covered in sand 
and rocks, and only four trees give any shade. There is one water point and three latrines set 
up by humanitarian organisations close by. My house is only 100 meters away so I can quickly 
go over when distributions start. At nine AM no one from the organisations has shown up, and 
the food still lays under the tents, covered with a tarp and protected by heavily armed military 
and a private security company. They are eating breakfast by their small tents right next to the 
food after guarding it through the night. At 0930 AM some cars from the organisations show 
up, they start to set up tables, fingerprint scanners and computers. At around ten AM, a bus 
with refugees arrives; they are trained in distributing food and gets driven from distribution to 
distribution. Refugees living nearby also come to work although they get paid less than the 
trained ones on the bus. They then clear the tarp from the food. Refugees who have a household 
size six start to show up, they get registered, and the distribution starts. 
 
The distribution of food is a monthly relief for most in Bid Bidi - the second-largest refugee 
camp in the world. Since the humanitarian organisations started to spread information in 2019 
that one day the food distribution will stop or be reduced, the refugee's' sense and expression 
of relief at receiving food have become even more significant. Since the food is supposed to 
last 30 days, this is what the people account for. This routine is essential for sustenance and the 




become a common problem which for the refugees means less food per person from the day 
they are told until the food is received. 
  Food is just one of many aspects of aid for refugees, although it is, perhaps, one 
of the most fundamental ones for the refugee's well-being. Furthermore, for some refugees in 
Uganda, food was one of the main arguments for them to come there instead of migrating to 
another country like DRC. Most refugees come to Uganda either because they have been there 
as refugees before or they follow their families and friends. Many know from experience how 
being a refugee in Uganda is, while others just follow their lead. Most of the refugees in the 
Bidi Bidi settlement has been there for three years which gives high level of awareness of what 
they can do as refugees and what they cannot. Their actions also affect the settlement, and their 
voices need to be respected due to new policies within humanitarian aid discourse in Uganda. 
Because of the refugees, there has come implementations such as guarding the food with 
military forces or operating fingerprint and eye scanners for various purposes of registration 
and surveillance.  
 Within the settlement, however, there is tripartite division of parties. The humanitarian 
organisations and the Ugandan government will be presented in relation to the others as one, 
the refugees as one and what is referred to as "the host community" by the humanitarian 
organisations, the Ugandan government and the refugees as one. These three parties, the 
humanitarian organisations and OPM, the refugees and the host community create a triangle of 
parties which creates friction between them. It is precisely the relations between these three 
parties this thesis will revolve around.  
I will in the thesis refer to the Ugandan governments presence in the settlement as The 
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) unless stated otherwise. They work closely with United 
Nations High Commissionaire for Refugees (UNHCR) which is responsible for overseeing the 
partners that they are funding and their work within the settlements and because of this they 
have little personnel in the field. Other organisations work within the settlement where UNHCR 
is working as a donor and is funding them. When referring to humanitarian organisations, I am 
referring to both UNHCR and all their partner organisations within the settlement, unless stated 
otherwise.  
 
Becoming a South Sudanese refugee in Uganda  
South Sudan is the youngest nation in the world (De Waal 2014). It politically and 
geographically split from Sudan in 2011 after a long and troublesome relationship. The people 




their lives, and many have fought in several armed conflicts. There are 64 different "tribes" in 
South Sudan who are all heavily effected and shaped by war and its consequences. In my thesis, 
when I refer to or use the term "tribe" or when using terms like "Dinka", "Nuer", "Kakwa" or 
similar terms, it is meant to refer to the self-assigned identity categories that are commonly used 
by refugees, host community and the humanitarian  organisations and OPM alike. These are 
terms used for descriptive purposes of the operative categories, not as indicators of coherent 
ethnic groups or socio-political organisations.  
 In December 2013, a veritable civil war broke out in South Sudan. This war is still 
ongoing today, and for most South Sudanese it is viewed as a preacher in the settlement said, 
"a war without meaning". For some, however, the war was not a surprise. As de Waal (2014, 
348-349) writes, there were several problematic aspects with the south Sudanese form of 
governance. It was kleptocratic in two ways, first in a way where the political leaders use every 
chance they get to steal public funds. Second, in the more original social-scientific sense where 
laws and regulations do not determine the functions of the authoritarian organs, but the 
mechanism of supply do. De Waal writes that governance is militarized, meaning that people 
in government use force or threaten with the use of it in bargaining. Furthermore, De Waal 
writes that "Governance transactions are highly monetised, and the cashflow to the rules is the 
heartbeat of governance." (2014, 348). This problematic and essentially contested form of 
governance was further exacerbated by militarising. As militarising occurs along tribal lines for 
personal security reasons (i.e. for protecting central figures of governance and their elites), this 
makes any military action risk for ethnic conflict (de Waal 2014, 361). 
 Bereketeab (2017) argues that the cause of the war lies in the personal conflict between 
Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, the previous leaders of Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) . The common understanding of what happened in 2013 is that the conflict started at a 
meeting between President, Salva Kiir from the Dinka tribe and vVce-President, Riek Machar 
from the Nuer tribe. The President accused the Vice President and ten others of attempting a 
state coup. Vice President Riek Machar denied the allegations, but the fighting between the 
tribal armies within SPLM had started. Machar quickly left South Sudan to control his forces 
from outside the country. Bereketeab (2017) also argues that because of the ethnic character of 
the personal conflict between the two leaders it quickly included other ethnic groups as well, 
making it a tribal war within the entire nation. The war has been met with multiple attempts at 
ceasefire and peace agreements from various initiatives, but none has achieved peace 
(Bereketeab 2017). Even though the war started in 2013, it was not until 2016 that the refugee 




 In only six months, from August 2016 to January 2017, the largest refugee camp in the 
world at the time was made in Yumbe district in Uganda with over 280 0001 people. The 
migration from South Sudan of refugees was mainly to Sudan and Uganda. In 2019 Uganda 
had 861 000 and Sudan 811 000 South Sudanese refugees each2. In 2020 there are 2,2 million 
refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan in the world3.  
 What makes the situation even worse is the fact that the large majority of the refugees 
are women and children. Bidi Bidi settlement, with a population of 223 939 (numbers from 
2018) Only 11,8 percent are men over the age of 18. There is 17,9 percent women above the 
age of 18, and 23,5 percent are children between the age of 0-4. This number is today higher 
since the count of children born in the settlement after 2016 had not been completed but was 
being conducted during my stay. Such numbers are troubling, especially when knowing that 
men over the age of 18 are often the sole provider of a household.  
 What helped the situation, is that as the people arrived, a pattern emerged where they 
migrate with friends, family or entire villages. Such migration where groups arrive together 
means that in Bidi Bidi each area has mostly people relating to each other or belonging to the 
same tribe. This was helpful, as most people try to stay with (or close to) their friends and 
family. Only the Dinka were placed in a specific area. They were placed close to the police 
station in the centre of the entire camp. The Dinka are commonly associated with the same tribe 
as President Salva Kiir, which is generally "known to be a tribe that wants war". For instance, 
when talking about the war and the different tribes with an elder preacher, he told me "The 
Dinka has said that South Sudan is theirs and that they just let the other tribes live there". Such 
things are often referred to when talking about the Dinka and are why they are not well-liked 
by most other tribes. Least of all by the Nuer commonly cast as the main opposing tribe in the 
civil war as well as in the past (See Hutchinson and Pendle 2015, Jok and Hutchinson 1999, de 
Waal 2014, Bereketeab 2017). 
 In the village where I gained access, there were mostly people from Central Equatoria, 
the Kakwa and Pojulu tribes, with Kakwa being the large majority. These two speak different 
forms of the Bari language. This makes it possible to communicate with few misunderstandings 
 
1 https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/uganda-refugee-response-monitoring-settlement-fact-sheet-bidi-bidi-june-
2018 [Originally published 30.06.18. downloaded 09.05.2020] 
The number of refugees in Uganda has received much critique from foreign donors such as Germany, USA, and 
England. Moreover, the numbers were not accurate since the counting system of refugees had many flaws. 
Although the number was most likely much lower, the camp would most likely still be the largest in the world at 
the time. 
2https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/southsudan [Last updated 31.12.19. downloaded 06. January 2020] 




(Vincent and Dihoff 1986). There are also several other languages spoken in the village. 
Therefore, it is mainly Juba Arabic that is spoken at meetings where the refugees meet. 
However, the meetings with humanitarian organisations and with OPM are usually held in 
English. Some refugees are quite good at English, but it varies greatly. The meetings are 
therefore usually translated by refugees, such as the village leaders. Actively translating makes 
them good at it, which make working for the organisations a lot simpler which can provide an 
income.  
 Uganda is one of the world’s largest receivers of refugees, with a refugee population of 
almost 1,4 million refugees4.They have been recognised by leading UN bodies as world-leading 
in their treatment of refugees and it is alleged, having obtained certain competence for treating 
them (The World Bank 2017). Many of the refugees have also internalised such a view of 
Ugandan capacities, due also to personal experiences; also know this cause many of the people 
who are refugees today were refugees in the 1990s as well. At that time, they fled from the civil 
war with Khartoum and SPLM5. When the refugees arrived in Uganda in the 1990s they arrived 
at another war. Even today, refugees get scared by stories of refugees being killed, tortured and 
disfigured. Finnström (2008a) describes this being done by rebels in Northern Uganda in the 
1990s for symbolic and silencing purposes. 
 For the refugees, these acts are not easy to forget, but even though people remember 
this, still today they want to flee to Uganda instead of countries like DRC or Tanzania. An 
impression from my fieldwork is that many flee to Uganda because they strongly believe that 
they will be treated better there—as is reflected in the following example from July 2019 on 
the border between Uganda and DRC:  
 
While visiting the Uganda-DRC border, I was sitting, waiting for a friend while he 
crossed the border to go to a market he had seen. While I was waiting, I sat on a bench 
under a metal sheet roof next to the road where people drove motorbikes loaded to the 
absolute maximum. Suddenly I see four children, a man and a woman, I assumed were 
their parents, walking across the border. They have almost nothing with them, the man 
carries a small bag, but that is all. Two officers come running out of a house to meet 
them, and they bring them over to the house where they sit down outside. I walk over 
 
4  https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/uganda-refugee-statistics-january-2020 [Released 01.02.2020. 
Downloaded 20. March 2020] 
5 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/uganda-refugees-build-camp-of-plenty-1367494.html [Published 




and ask the two officers what is happening. One officer explains to me that they are 
refugees from South Sudan. He manages to talk to the man who explains that his father 
was the one who had told them that they should flee South Sudan, but he had died on 
the way. They had been fleeing through the jungle for four months and managed to get 
to DRC. There, they had received some food and was put in a camp. They had then 
decided that they should rather go to Uganda. I asked why he thought that Uganda was 
better, the officer translated for me. The man said that in Uganda they will be 
taught English in school which they much prefer, and the humanitarian organisations 
give food and not just money to buy it like they do in DRC. This was their two main 
arguments for leaving DRC for Uganda. When my friend, who is also a refugee returned 
and met them, he gave them some of the food he had bought and gave them some money 
to aid them in the coming days. We then got back on our motorbike and started a long 
drive home.  
  
Such arguments as education, language and food, make fleeing to Uganda the preferred choice 
for many. Uganda has put in place acts and laws protecting the refugees, that are designed to 
make life easier for them and empower them. These acts and laws allow the refugees free 
movement, land to farm, food and not money at food distributions as long as it is possible. They 
also have a right to education for the children equal to the public-school system in Uganda. 
How my friend, as a refugee is able and willing to help out another refugee he does not know, 
show how he can understand the situation the family is in. It also shows how he who has been 
a refugee for almost three years has become able to aid others in worse situations than himself. 
The subject of how the refugees are empowered by OPM and other international documents 
will be discussed in chapter one. By making many of these laws’ public knowledge for the 
refugees, they are given a tool to claim their formal and legal rights within the country when 
facing humanitarian organisations, OPM and the host communities. However, as the refugees 
have received this particular form of power of knowledge, so has the Ugandan host 
communities around the refugee camp. Of particular interest for the refugee camp dynamic vis-
à-vis the local Ugandan community, is that OPM has adopted a policy that is widely known as 
“the 70/30 rule”.  One that all so-called host communities in Uganda are familiar with. It says, 
in rough terms, that for aid given by the humanitarian organisations, 30 percent is to go to the 
local community and the remainder to the refugees. The rule comes from the document 




created by the World Bank and the UN to aid Uganda in sustainable treatment of the refugees 
through policies (The World Bank 2017). 
 Throughout the thesis, I use the term «host community». This refers to the category of 
people who are part of the communities that have given away land to the refugees to live on. 
Because of this, they have the right to receive 30 percent of all aid given by the organisations. 
After the 70/30 rule was adopted, it quickly became a policy for Uganda and made all host 
communities of refugees expecting their share. Many humanitarian organisations are against 
this policy, some, for instance, having their policies stating that all money from them must go 
to refugees. An aid worker made an example of this stating that they, as an organisation, were 
not allowed by their organisation to give aid to anyone but displaced people. An officer from 
OPM later told me that humanitarian organisations are not allowed to give aid in Uganda if they 
do not respect the 70/30 policy. The 70/30 rule creates a tension between the humanitarian 
organisations, host and the refugees—as I will show later in the thesis. 
 
Approaching a triangle of power and resistance 
Above, I have introduced some fundamental aspects of refugee life, the reasons for the presence 
of refugees in Bidi Bidi and how a central dynamic revolves around the organisation of the 
camp and the distribution of food. Central here is the tensions between the parties. They are 
here described as refugees, the host community and the composite figure of humanitarian 
organisations and the Ugandan state. The refugee camp is a context where power is extensively 
exercised. Further, to understand the forms of resistance going on in the refugee camp—as in 
any form of society—one needs to pay analytical attention to how power is applied. 
  This thesis does not set out to discuss the nature of power itself. However, informed by 
fieldwork in the Bidi Bidi camp and, especially, the experiences of the refugees whom I lived 
with for six months, the thesis sets out to examine and analyse the mechanisms of power and 
how these are entwined with forms of resistance. Such a focus is informed by Foucault's 
approach to how power has been viewed: "This analysis simply involves investigating where 
and how, between whom, between what points, according to what processes, and with what 
effects, power is applied."(Foucault 2009, 1-2). These mechanisms are the ones that affect the 
relations within the settlement and what this thesis will go deeper in to, not what power is. The 
definition of power is therefore not necessary, only what one party's power is in relation to 
another party and how, why, and what consequences its use has, is relevant. 
 Foucault said “In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of 




an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the 
future.”(Foucault 1982, 789). By analysing these actions alone, it would be easy to say that 
OPM and humanitarian organisations are in power and the only power the refugees or the host 
community has is to respond passively, but it is not so simple. 
 To understand this power relation, the whole notion of power needs to be approached 
in a more nuanced manner. Eric Wolf (1990) differentiates between four forms of power: 1) 
The personal form of power, i.e. that one person has the power to act and is capable. 2) The 
second form is the power one person has over another, i.e. one person's ability to impose its 
will on another person; this is where power becomes social. This form is much the same way 
as Weber (2009) understands power. 3) An organisational form of power is where someone or 
something has the power to control people's actions in different settings. This is a more 
comprehensive type than the second where one can impose its will on to multiple people in 
different situations. However, having organisational power, one will still have limits. 4) 
Structural power, Similar to organisational power controls what is happening within certain 
situations. However, it also set the situations up and then has the power to control the flow of 
power. Wolf (1990) use structural power as that which structure the political economy. In my 
analysis, I wish to analytically apply Wolf's fourpartite approach to understand what forms of 
powers are present and operating in the different scenarios in the settlement. Furthermore, this 
is helpful also to clarify how these actions are then acted upon within the limits of each party's 
form of power. 
 Although Wolf's(1990) terms for different forms of power is useful as a tool to think 
and discuss the power and it makes power more dynamic than that of for instance (Weber 2009). 
Dividing it into four types is not dynamic enough to get a complete understanding of the 
resistant acts that occur within the camp. It helps us understand what power one party has in 
relation to another, but not how or why that power is used and what consequences its use might 
have. 
 Approaching resistance: Within the camp and within anthropology, the actions in 
"actions upon actions" that Foucault describes in a power relationship, can be defined as forms 
of resistance. Since both parts in interaction have power, they will most likely have different 
amounts and types, as Wolf (1990) argues. In the instance of the refugees and the humanitarian 
organisations, one has structural while the other has organisational. To commit an act of power 
can then quickly become an act of resistance. But what defines an act of resistance?    
 Foucault wrote, “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 




1978, 95). Influenced by this view of resistance as not reducible to a position beyond power, I 
will argue that both the power and the resistance is dynamic, that it is continuously changing 
depending on the situation, the relation and the actors themselves. Power and resistance are 
therefore acted out in what Long (2003) calls “the interface”, i.e. the meeting point between 
two parties where every aspect of their lives meet. Such aspects are also dependent on the 
specific situation. Although he applies the concept of the interface to face-to-face encounters, 
Lie (2015) similarly argues that it is within the interface one can identify resistance, right in the 
meeting point between two parties with two different life worlds.   
 Based on such readings of interface and power, I will argue that resistance is not just 
something practised by the weaker of two parties but that we should approach it in a broader 
sense to encompass practices based on power to resist other people's power. I see resistance, as 
the countering force of power and at the same time power as that which makes resistance 
possible and necessary in the eyes of the beholder. Resistance becomes an act of power, and at 
the same time the power is what is resisted. The resistance is then acted out between two or 
more parties in a power relation, regardless of who has the most power. I will, therefore, define 
a resistant act as an act which is either intended to, or result in, either challenging or directly 
remove, whole or parts of another party's or persons power. It is therefore power that is resisted 
and not just the party itself. Foucault (1982, 789) argues: “In effect, what defines a relationship 
of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. 
Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those 
which may arise in the present or the future.” (Foucault 1982, 789) I understand the power, as 
the controlling factor. A party will therefore be defined by the amount and form of power they 
have. Therefore, resisting a party´s power, one also resists the party itself. Actions are not 
resisted, but countered or responded to with other actions, which requires power. 
Empowerment, as I will discuss in chapter one, therefore, becomes that which makes one able 
to resist other parties' power.  
 While Hollander and Einwohner (2004) mainly discuss recognition and intent of the act 
as the important factors to deem an act resistant. When approaching resistance, the way I am, 
recognition becomes irrelevant as one need not recognise an act towards oneself for it to 
challenge or result in one losing power. The intent, however, is different, as it comes down to 
the resistant act being successful or not. A failed resistant act is still resistant. This will be 
shown examples of in chapter two. However, to get an understanding of the true act of 
resistance, both these factors will matter. To deem an act resistant, one needs to know the party's 




position. The issues of recognition and intent are still relevant, but not for deeming the acts 
resistant or not, but to get a better understanding of the true act and thereby understand the 
relation between the parties better which is the goal. Issues surrounding recognition and intent 
will be discussed further throughout the thesis. 
 When discussing dynamic resistance, I will differ between two different forms of 
resistance, although their limits are fluent, it will help to give an understanding of the relation 
between the parties in the situation. First is resistance as a form of communication, this 
resistance is based on a sense of understanding between the parties—i.e. conforming to the 
notion of recognition. The understanding between the parties is something I will refer to as 
intersubjectivity, which I will discuss further in chapter two. However, in this guise, the 
resistant acts are not exerted necessarily to tear down the power of other parties or challenge 
them directly. The acts are, I would like to show, communicative in a way that they tell other 
parties that their acts are not accepted or that they simply disagree with how things are done. 
These acts can be hidden such as Scott (1985, 301) writes: "A harvest labourer who steals paddy 
from his employer is "saying" that his need for rice takes precedence over the formal property 
rights of his boss." Such acts can only be deemed communicative if the intention is clear for 
the resistor as the intent has to be communication. Even if it is not, it can still be deemed 
resistant as explained above but will come into the other category as I will soon explain. On the 
other hand, how the act is perceived if noticed at all is not important for deeming the act resistant 
or communicative, since it will only deem the act successful or not. Both parts are, however, 
essential to find out since the intention of the act and understanding of it by other parties can 
tell us a lot about the relation between the parties involved.  
 The other form of resistance is irreducible to effect. These acts can be resistant without 
tangible effect or an instrumentality. I will refer to such acts as unintentional resistance, not 
because the acts themselves are unintentional but because the acts often do not have a specific 
intention. These acts are often similar to what Scott calls "everyday forms of resistance" (Scott 
1985) but can also be similar to the acts discussed by Abu-Lughod (2008) where they can be as 
simple as the way people talk about others, how they name them and making jokes. These acts 
are also resistant but have little effect unless they are part of a bigger collective, as Scott argues 
(1985, 44). If multiple people are feeling the same about the same party or different 
representatives of a controlling collective party, Scott argues it can result in collective acts. 
When asked about such acts, most participants would deny that it is resistant towards the other 
parties, but I will still deem it so. Conversations as Scott refers to, are resistant in and of 




conversations are often a launchpad for more extensive resistant actions as they can entice 
individual resistant acts, part of a multitude of collective actions or can result in organised 
actions such as strikes or rebellions. As Scott (1985) argues, the individual acts do often not 
have a specific intention and often go unnoticed by the intended receiver of the resistant acts 
until they become a collective action at which point, they will affect the receiver where they 
will have a response. Scott uses the term “class” when discussing resistance. Within the 
settlement, however, this term is challenging to use because of the multitude of other factors 
that affects class within the settlement. Even though the class term is troublesome, the struggles 
in the settlement are similar to the class struggles in the rest of society and the settlement is not 
outside society at large. 
 In my analysis, I will treat these two forms of resistance as not distinctly separate and 
show how acts can consist of both forms of resistance simultaneously and vary for different 
actors. This will occur within the form which I have decided to refer to as unintentional 
resistance as such acts can be communicative without the person knowing the intentions. 
However, since the intent of the act is important, it comes down to the researcher to determine 
and understand the intent of an act. Nevertheless, intention and recognition are not essential to 
deem the act resistant or not, but both factors help in the understanding of the relation in the 
situation. 
 
Cadastralization of refugees 
Ugandan aid workers often take great pride in their work with refugees. In particular, they pride 
themselves in having what they call refugee settlements and not camps like many other 
countries in the region— for instance, such camps as Liisa Malkki (1995a) describe from her 
book Purity and Exile. Anna Schmidt (2003, 4-5) defines camps by five criteria’s in her text 
“FMO Thematic Guide: Camps versus settlement". The first criteria is that in a settlement there 
is supposed to be freedom of movement. The more this is restricted, the more it takes the 
character of a camp. In Uganda, the refugees have freedom of movement—this is clear from 
the example where I joined a refugee interlocutor going to the DRC-Uganda border. However, 
it does not mean they do not have any restrictions. As an example, they are not allowed to go 
to South Sudan; this would mean they would lose their rights as refugees. Further, they have to 
report to the authority of the settlement whenever they want to leave. In practice, however, both 
of these requirements are mostly ignored by both refugees and authorities. The second criteria 
is the mode of assistance/economy; being able to farm and take part in the economy is often 




refugees in Bidi Bidi do receive land both to live on and farm. Most can farm the land they are 
given, but the quality of land differs greatly. The issue here is not the amount of land, but the 
quality of it, combined with an unpredictable climate. Farming will be further discussed in 
chapter one. The third criteria is the mode of governance.  In refugee camps, decision making 
usually happens outside the camp, without involving the refugees. In a settlement, refugees 
govern themselves more than in a camp, and decision making happens, to some extent, among 
the refugees. In all the refugee villages in Uganda, there is a formally recognised leader. They 
are elected, for a two-year period. The power that a leader has can be extensive and they can 
have great respect among the people. However, among the humanitarian organisations, village 
leaders are often treated as just another refugee. Gender and equalisation were an important 
aspect within the settlement regarding the elections of village leaders and other positions of 
power. Both male refugees and humanitarian organisation workers encouraged women to take 
such roles as it is seen as a large part of gender equalisation in the settlement. However, the 
large majority of such roles were still vacated by men. The Fourth criteria is that the camp is 
designated as a temporary locations/shelters. This means that the camp is meant to be temporary 
and so the structures of the houses and policies surrounding the camp are created accordingly. 
In Bidi Bidi, they have received refugee ID cards that expire in 2024. Although not expressed 
by camp authorities, many refugees have taken this as a sign that that is the year Bidi Bidi will 
close. The last criteria are the population size and density. In short, camps have a much higher 
population density than what can be seen in a settlement. Additional land is also often given to 
the refugees in a settlement for farming. Such priorities would not be seen in a camp. 
  The five criteria defining camp versus settlement is generally helpful to delineate certain 
aspects of the camp. However, one aspect that Schmidt (2003) does not take into account, is 
biometrics which is eye and fingerprint scanning, and gives each refugee their own profile. 
Such technology was implemented by UNHCR partly as a response to the wrongful counting 
of the refugees to get an accurate number of refugees in the country6. Through biometric 
technology authorities can keep better control of the refugees. Biometrics will be further 
discussed in chapter three.  
 By talking to people, I got a good understanding of how the settlement is set up. The 
settlement started in a small village called Bidi Bidi, but the continuing stream of refugees 
 
6 https://www.biometricupdate.com/201811/government-and-unhcr-complete-huge-biometric-refugee-





required expansion. OPM were forced to open new zones, and local communities were ready 
to give more land, and zone 2 opened, followed by zone 3, zone 4 and zone 5. This resulted in 
almost 250 000 people spread out on 250 square kilometres. Each zone held approximately 50 
000 people. The zones were then divided up into villages, and each village was given a number 
as the land was cadastralized. The number of villages in a zone can vary between 10 to 25, and 
village sizes from a few hundred to 10 000. The density of the villages also differed, some being 
just across the road while others could be a 20-minute walk away. Because of organising 
purposes, the villages were put into clusters, from 3-5 villages in each cluster and some single 
because of their size or distance to other villages. As all refugees received 30*30 meters of land, 
all these squares of land were placed just next to each other. The villages were divided into 
what they call tanks which is a geographically defined space in the village. All these structures 
are there to ease the distribution of aid. They were created as the camp expanded and it is the 
same today, three years later.  
   The map (Figure 1) below7 is a detailed plan of how the humanitarian organisations and 
OPM wanted the settlement to look. When viewing the map on a computer, it is possible to see 
all details of infrastructure in the settlement.  
 The process described above may be seen analytically as a form of cadastralization, the 
object of which is to emplace people and link their spaces to particular areas on maps. Such 
processes make it easier for OPM and humanitarian organisations to monitor, control and 
govern the settlement. This form of cadastralization builds on James Scott (1998) use of the 
term. He discusses, broadly speaking, how governments emplaced people where a central 
aspect was that it happened through cadastral mapping. This serves to standardise their 
societies, easing the gathering of taxes and increasing production. Scott argues that with 
everyone following the same structures, it makes it easier to govern. I argue that cadastralization 
happens in the settlement, but for other reasons than in the large-scale nation-states or 
modernisation processes that Scott discuss. I argue that the government and humanitarian 
organisations do it to improve their aid distribution and governing of the refugees.  
Because of the differences between camp and settlement, I deem Bidi Bidi a refugee settlement 
and will refer to it as a settlement in the thesis. 
 










 As these cadastralizing structures are quite overarching within the settlement, they are 
impossible not to be affected by. Even though one is free to move where one wants, while 
staying there even I had the feeling of being controlled, governed, organised and living within 
a structured space. Even though the humanitarian organisations and OPM cadastralize the 
refugees to more effectively give aid, the refugees still experience negative consequences daily. 
These structures become a form of structural resistance towards the refugees as it limits their 
organisational power by not being able to structure their own space as they wish. This form of 
resistance shapes the refugee's lives, forming them and limiting them. These consequences will 
be further discussed in chapter three.  
 I argue, cadastralization is done to make the distribution of aid better and more efficient. 
To improve the efficiency of the aid, the humanitarian organisations also organize themselves 
to be able to cooperate. They therefore divided the organisations into seven different sectors, 
depending on what type of work they are doing or services they provide. These sectors are 
health and nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, food security, education, environment, child 
protection and shelter and other infrastructure. Organisations working in different  sectors have 
what they call zone meetings where all organisations from all sectors meet. These meetings will 
be referred to in the thesis accordingly. In my analysis, I will not separate the sectors but simply 
refer to the humanitarian organisations. This is because the sector has little relevance to the 
relations between the refugees and humanitarian organisations.  
 
Hospitality and resistance  
Michael and I walk out into the bush, upon a small hillside. There, almost on the top, there is 
going to be a meeting between a leader from the host community and about ten refugees. The 
refugees there are the few that are interested in more land to farm and were told of the meeting. 
The man who is an Acholi from the local community has a long speech about him, giving them 
land, and he makes one point that stands out more than others. He says that he can remember 
when he was a child when he and his father were refugees in Sudan, in an area that is today 
South Sudan. They had received land from the local community to farm. He said that back then 
that land saved their lives, they would be living on the street if it was not for that community 
helping them. He then continued saying that the land in South Sudan is very fertile compared 
to here, but he would still give them as much land as they wanted. 
 
Reciprocity can become strong although it is rarely called upon as vocally as here. To remember 




later, can be a tall order. However, some of the host communities do precisely that. For a long 
time, there have been issues of land between the host communities and the refugees. The land 
in question is additional land to that given by the organisations which are 30*30 to live on. 
Since the settlement is so large, there are multiple host communities, and they often solve issues 
in different ways. Some solved the land issues with the refugees by giving the host community 
50 000 UGX (13,15 USD) for a plot of 50*70 meters of land which became the refugee's 
property until they go back to South Sudan. In other parts of the settlement, the host community 
gave land for free to the refugees who are often supported with contracts med by the 
humanitarian organisations and some places the humanitarian organisations needed to be a 
negotiator between the parties. Such solutions have taken a long time to come up with and few 
are as hospitable as the host described above. Being the host, however, provide a form of power 
which is essential and is empowerment that can be explicitly used. 
 Rozakou (2012) looks at Greek hospitality for refugees as comprised of a power relation 
which is quite common in anthropological analyses of contexts where refugees and non-
refugees co-inhabit. Indicative of such a vein of anthropological analysis, Rozakou argues that 
showing hospitality toward refugees is a way of showing acknowledgement and inclusion, but 
that it can also put the refugee in-between two categories of “biological life and complete 
political existence” (Rozakou 2012, 573). As the refugees in Greece lacked power and agency 
when meeting humanitarian organisation as refugees, the voluntaries visited the refugees, 
making them the hosts, giving them an agency in that situation (Rozakou 2012).  
Different from Greece, the refugees in Bidi Bidi already have forms of agency; they are 
empowered to resist and be heard. Rather than a form of power-imbued hospitality exerted from 
the host community, I will in this thesis see reciprocity as a critical dynamic shaping the 
relationship between all parties in the settlement. This is because also the humanitarian 
organisations take part in the reciprocal relations within the settlement. Between the host 
community and the refugee’s hospitality and resistance, therefore, do not have to negate each 
other in these circumstances: The host can be friendly and hospitable based on acts of 
reciprocity or profit, but they can at the same time resist claims from the refugees since they 
are not necessarily always wanted. 
 When asked what they want, most of the refugees answer that they want to go back to 
South Sudan, but some also claim that they would like to stay in Uganda, that they have nothing 
to go back to in South Sudan. Some even want to become Ugandan citizens, being able to get 
land and make a living there, but few are willing to give up their rights as refugees as a 




on the other hand, want the water stations, schools, jobs and health centres which are the main 
reason most of them allow the refugees to stay. These aspects effect their relationship as it is 
often what their acts are based on. Hospitality will be further discussed in chapter four. 
 
Conclusion  
When embarking on my fieldwork, my research was centred on the following question: How 
do OPM and humanitarian organisations support, affect the relationship between themselves, 
the refugees and the host community in the Bidi Bidi refugee settlement? My initial response 
to this post-fieldwork was that this occurred in several ways but that it revolved around a central 
and perhaps counter-intuitive socio-political dynamic; That the refugees and the host 
community have been empowered by documents from OPM and the humanitarian 
organisations which the refugees use to resist and shape the aid given to them. In the Thesis 
this focus has shifted towards the relations between the parties, how all parties affect each other 
and how their acts change depending on the situation and the relations they are set in. 
 During fieldwork and post-fieldwork there are multiple aspect that could have been 
discussed. One aspect could have been gender and where the organisations affect the 
performances and identity-making processes of both. Also, I could have discussed witchcraft 
or demon possession as this was also part of everyday life and central to religious practice. I 
could have looked closer at the perspective of waiting or temporality for refugees, never 
knowing when to go home. Focusing on the relation between the parties and not a specific 
aspect of it, I was able to get knowledge about the different subjects since they are all affected 
by some parts of the relations. Many of the different aspects such as gender or temporality 
became apparent when observing the relations as these aspects are not statically apparent among 
the refugees. 
 The thesis will discuss four topics in four different chapters all relating to the relations 
within the settlement. In chapter one, I will present my arrival to the field and some ethical 
perspectives, I will then discuss the definition of a refugee and then their empowerment in 
Uganda. I will then go on to present land and farming as it is an important aspect of being a 
refugee in Uganda. I will present specific ways in which the humanitarian organisations and 
OPM use cadastralization to gather information and govern the refugees. I argue that 
cadastralization shape the relation between the parties as it empowers and shapes the refugees 
and their acts. 
 In chapter two, I discuss some of the different ways resistant acts are played out by the 




present two cases, the first one about a protest that turns in to a strike, and a second where a 
collective movement grew out from silently unorganized individual acts. I will argue that the 
resistance acted out are dependent on the form of power a party has as well as the other party's 
response to those acts. Resistant acts are dynamic, similarly to how power is dynamic. These 
resistant acts dynamically adapt to the situation, forms of power and the relations in which they 
take place.   
 Chapter three explores how the humanitarian organisations use Foucault´s 
governmentality through multiple disciplinary mechanisms. I will then continue to discuss 
cadastralization from chapter one and discuss its potential consequences. As a form of 
cadastralization, I further discuss the biometric structures and their consequences. I then move 
on to show how the power the humanitarian organisations get through cadastralization and 
governmentality is resisted. I will argue that the resistance changes as the governing structures 
changes, showing examples of how the resistance is dynamic and continuously changing. This 
is all discussed with three different cases. The first case is about registration of the refugees, 
the second is about the resistant act of stealing food and the third about cheating the 
humanitarian organisations' systems. I will argue that these resistant acts are shaped and further 
shapes the power relations. 
 Finally, in chapter four, I present the host community and how they react to the situation 
of having refugees living on their land. I discuss this through acts of hospitality and resistance 
and argue that hospitality and the resistance do not have to oppose each other. The chapter goes 
through four different cases where the first two shows the differences in resistance from the 
host community in the past and today. The third case shows how the relationship between the 
host community and the refugees are often based on cheating and tricking. The fourth case 
focus on the misunderstandings of what the host community can receive from the humanitarian 
organisations. I will discuss how all these acts affects and are affected by the relations within 
the settlement. I will argue that the relationship between the refugees and the host community 
is shaped by their relation to the humanitarian organisations and OPM through reciprocity and 
hospitality. 
  Note that other than discussing different aspects that affect the relations within the 
settlement. There is an underlying argument throughout the thesis. That is, challenging the 
notion that refugees are people who have no influence in history. This contribute to a broader 
debate supporting Liisa Malkki (1996, 1995a, 1992, 1995b) and many others, who are argue 
that refugees are rendered as people without an agency and made speechless. This thesis will 




Chapter 1  
Becoming a refugee in Uganda and the receiving of land 






Julia tells me of her arrival at the Bidi Bidi settlement while we are both sitting outside 
her house sharing some maize cobs: "When we first arrived, there was nothing. We 
arrived in a truck which dropped us off here. They told us where our land was, and that 
is where we made a tent out of the tarp UNHCR gave to us. The land was covered in 
trees and bushes, and we had nothing to remove it with. It was the bush. We had to pay 
the host community to come and remove it for us. I had some money with me from South 
Sudan and paid them to also build a house for me, but that was only after some time." 
 
The land that Julie refers to is the standard plot of land that refugees receive when arriving in 
Bidi Bidi: 30*30 metres. The plot is intended for building houses, as well as a small plot of 
farmland next to the houses. In Bidi Bidi settlement, people are allocated a village and plot as 
they arrive, decided by the organisations. The village I lived in was large compared to other 
villages in the settlement. According to people´s accounts, included the village leader, the 
village contained approximately 8000 people in 2017. In June 2019, the number was closer to 
6000. Refugees in Uganda receive certain rights upon arrival. Although refugees have some 
fundamental rights all over the world, in Uganda, they are further empowered by rights. These 
rights includes receiving land to live on and to farm, move where they want when they want, 
as well as being allowed to participate in the local economy. However, the humanitarian 
organisations and OPM find ways to control and govern the refugees.  
 This chapter will first present how I settled in the settlement, how I found my informants 
and how I throughout both field work and writing process took ethical considerations. I will 
then discuss a definition of what a refugee is and some of their history. I will then go on to 
discuss how refugees are empowered in Uganda and how it affects them. Much of the 
empowerment happens through the land the refugees receive. I will go on to discuss the farming 
and the climate in the settlement and how this affects the refugees and their relation to the other 
parties. Towards the end, I will discuss what is referred to as the household. I will discuss how 
it shapes, and is shaped by, the refugees. I will argue that although a household is an institution 
implemented by the humanitarian organisation and is there for them to keep better control of 
the refugees, the refugees build and shape it to their liking. My main argument in the chapter is 
that although the refugees are empowered, they are cadastralized through farmland and the 







After an almost two months struggle to get all the paperwork done in Kampala to be allowed 
into the settlement, I finally arrived in Yoyo, the closest village to Bidi Bidi settlement in 
MONTH YEAR. I met Enoch Sengonze, a student of Professor Eria Olowo Onyango from 
Makerere University, and whom I had been in contact with before I arrived. Enoch worked as 
a health aid worker for a Ugandan organisation and was able to take me along on his daily work 
in the settlement. Through him I became quickly acquainted with parts of the settlement, 
learning names and locations of different villages which later turned out be very helpful. Enoch 
included me in work within the settlement, among other things, health checks on children. 
Coincidentally, a male refugee translating during health checks had a house in his household 
that he did not use. Enoch introduced us, and it was this man and his family who became my 
host family in Bidi Bidi.  Late February 2019 I met my host family, the people I was going to 
live with the next six months within the settlement. 
           An issue which came to my attention quickly, however, was that of transport. The village 
was too far away to be able to walk anywhere which would take me all day and bicycles on 
rocky and sandy roads were not very tempting. With the help of Enoch I managed to buy a 
motorcycle. Motorcycles were not uncommon in the settlement, and both my host family and 
the village leader had one. I concluded that it was socially acceptable for me to also have one. 
Having one also opened up the entire settlement as a fieldwork site as I was able to reach people 
and places, I had not been able to before. 
           My fieldwork was, however, not confined to that settlement alone, but following the 
arguments of Gupta (1997), the village became the central location of gathering information 
about the refugees in general. Through the village, I saw how people moved and developed by 
moving past the theoretical boundaries of villages and the settlement as a whole, as people 
frequently travelled to such places as South Sudan, Kampala as well as local towns.  
           The host family became a vital source of information, as well as my primary source of 
learning Bari, the language spoken by most in that village. Although I never became able to 
conduct a conversation in the language, learning it made me much more accepted in the village 
as they were not used to hearing white people speak their language. Coincidentally my host 
family were also neighbours with the village leader. He became my key informant and friend. 
As Hammersley (2007) argues for, quite early in my fieldwork I considered whether the relation 
could be of a hindrance in my fieldwork as people would respond to me differently. However, 
after some time, I realised he was more a respected friend to all than a leader. His knowledge 




out to be the gatekeeper, not only for the village, but also to village leaders in all nearby villages. 
On top of this, he made it possible for me to participate in meetings between the humanitarian 
organisations, refugees and the host community.  
           Both the head in my host family and the village leader were both prominent men in the 
village, who were well known and well respected by all. Furthermore, as Amit (1999) argues 
for the importance of key informants, my connection with them became one of my primary 
sources of information. Also, through them, my entire fieldwork opened up very fast. They 
advised me to go to the different churches and present myself to everyone, which is how I 
quickly became known to everyone in the village. I later found out that among many aid 
workers, I became known as the crazy white man in so and so village.  
           I stayed in the village for six months, and people got used to seeing me around, being in 
meetings and visiting different people almost every day. When I visited people, conversations 
often came to the subject of South Sudan and the war (de Waal 2014, 2019, Bereketeab 2017). 
This gave me an opportunity to ask about their experience of the war now and previous wars in 
South Sudan, as well as their experiences when fleeing South Sudan. Jackson (2002) writes 
about how survival stories might be of such a personal nature, and therefore not be told to 
anyone who might not understand. My impression is that it was an important story for them to 
tell, even though they probably knew I could not understand, and I cannot claim that I do 
understand their experiences. I asked one of the oldest men in the village if he wanted to tell 
me about his life, he asked me back "Why do you want my story? It is very simple; it is just 
war, war, war" He was however very willing to talk to me later and did so happily. I also wanted 
to hear stories from people that I did not necessarily have a close relationship to. Therefore, I 
asked the village leader if he might know someone who might be willing to share their story. 
As my information was retrieved through the village leaders’ contacts, this might impact what 
stories I got and from whom. I concluded that the stories themselves would still be a true and a 
real recollection of events from South Sudan and refugee life in Bidi Bidi. The village leader 
helped me in getting in touch with a handful of people that were willing to share their stories. 
Sharing their stories in detail, and being happy to do so, they wanted to share their stories to 
anyone who would listen.  
 Jackson (2002, 96) claim that: "For refugees, their stories remain open, like wounds, for 
as long as it takes for dispersed families to be reunited, for lines of communication between 
them to be re-established, for the suffering and uncertainty in the homeland to end, and for the 
shock of resettlement to pass." This might be problematic for interviewing early arrived 




their arrival, none of them had dispersed family members or broken communication, and few 
felt the shock of resettlement. The war in South Sudan is not over. Still, most people I talked 
with expressed a sense of safety in the settlement and were at ease with their situation. I also 
found that the people, despite of traumatic experiences expressed hope, strength in them 
surviving the situation and a more positive look to the present and future. This supports Kidron's 
argument in (Stromberg, Broch-Due, and Bertelsen 2016) that therapeutic constructs of trauma 
can often focus too little on the strength of the human spirit, endurance of the mind and that 
there is hope, also in refugee settlements. As Du Boulay and Williams (1984) argue for I also 
gathered life stories and stories from the war quite later in my fieldwork. 
           An issue for me with gathering such stories was that I never became adequate in their 
langue to be able to gather such stories alone. Also, many lacked sufficient English skills to be 
able to express themselves adequately. This resulted in using the village leader as a translator 
to gather their stories. Doing that might have affected what they shared and how they told their 
stories. Still, it is not my impression that they held back. They elaborated their stories without 
my encouragement, and some even invited me to return so that they could share even more 
stories and experiences which I often did. Du Boulay and Williams (1984) also argue that 
talking in a native language, makes it easier for them to express themselves correctly and makes 
it simpler for them to tell their story. There are not many recollections of trauma and violence 
in the thesis. But I deem the discussion surrounding the ethics of collecting such stories an 
important subject. I find the stories of trauma to be an important part of their experiences, and 
to respect a vulnerable group, I include these stories to respectfully create a more whole image 
of their experiences. 
           Another important issue surrounding ethical principles while conducting fieldwork in a 
refugee settlement is that of anonymity. While the refugee's anonymity is essential, it is also 
important to not portray them as a homogenous group of people but respect their values as 
representatives of their cultures as well as being a refugee. This has been a focus throughout 
the writing process. Not doing this adds to the contestation that refugees are speechless (Malkki 
1996). However, anonymising people and places are essential because of the close relationship 
between the different parties. It is crucial to make sure nothing anyone, including host or 
refugees, has said or done can cause them any harm in the future. Names are therefore changed, 
and specific places never stated. 
           All organisation names have been concealed, for two reasons. First, to make the workers 




argument. It is the actions of an organisation that matters, not what organisations it is. All aid 
workers are also anonymous, for the sake of work security.  
 However, an issue, presented by Hopkins (1996), is that my location and the people I 
interacted with make it difficult to keep all data completely anonymous and protected. Locals 
who read the thesis might be able to understand whom I am talking about. This is why I have, 
to the best of my knowledge, not included information that could come to harm anyone. 
However, I am aware that this can never be guaranteed. 
 
Defining a refugee  
The history of the documented refugee is long, starting in the 1920s after WWI where the so-
called Nansen passport was the first document to state that someone was stateless, allowing its 
bearers entry into 52 countries. As a consequence of WWII, the number of refugees increased 
as people fled their countries all over the world. It is, therefore, reasonable to say that the history 
of the refugee that we know today starts in this period, and in 1950 the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established. The UNHCR was responsible for 
managing refugees in need, and as a humanitarian organisation, it has grown enormously in 
size and with an increasing amount of responsibilities since. During the "Convention and 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees"—held in 1951—the first and still standing 
definition of a refugee was established. At the convention 26 countries signed the document 
which defines a refugee as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of 
origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (Assembly 1951). What they 
agreed on in 1951 has helped millions of people after, but it has also been criticized. 
Penchaszadeh (2010, 64) argues that the definition of a refugee, made by the UN, removes the 
right of movement and settlement. By doing this, Penchaszadeh argues the right to receive 
refugees are over the right the refugees have to be received. By doing this, refugees no longer 
have the power to move and settle as they wish, but nations have the right to treat refugees in 
"special" ways. A similar case is also made by Paolo Gaibazzi who argue with cases of 
deportation from Angola. He argues for a different view on governance and dehumanization in 
anthropology. He writes: “Inhumanity degrades migrants to a state of bare prey rather than bare 
life” (2018, 478). He argues that migrants are abused in places they move to, making them prey. 
For the refugees, this can sometimes mean falling prey to the host community and even the 





 The state is not always able to give aid to refugees, and so the humanitarian 
organisations have responsibility for aid distribution. However, as Harrell-Bond (2002, 55) 
argues; by making someone dependent of aid also disempowers them, as one becomes the 
refugees’ only life source. Therefore, humanitarian organisations are both giving aid as well as 
strengthening institutions that are disempowering for the refugees. This makes the refugees 
victims. Though refugees by definition are victims, this kind of victimization is not what is 
wanted or needed. This makes peace in their own country the only way for the refugees to be 
truly empowered again. 
 When I asked some of the refugees in the village if they would be able to stay if the 
organisations stopped giving them food, some respond with a distinct "No", others just laugh 
and ask me in return if I thought that would be possible or asked me if I thought they could. 
Even though the refugees have received land to become more self-reliant, they are still 
disempowered by a dependence to the organisations.   
 The definition made in 1951 definition also changes the refugees in ways they make a 
living. The definition changes their options and situation and thereby also changes their 
priorities accordingly. Their survival strategies and to how they get money and fend for their 
families, changes. Harrell-Bond (2002) writes that "The stereotype of the helpless refugees also 
informs refugees' perceptions concerning the role they are expected to play to gain the approval 
of the helpers and to be successful in obtaining aid." She continues: "As most refugees are able 
to infer, accepting their client role and ingratiating themselves with camp authorities and 
individual helpers is one of the survival strategies used in the context of fierce competition over 
scarce humanitarian aid resources." (Harrell-Bond 2002, 57). When being disempowered and 
having to rely on organisations for survival, the refugees are forced to start with alternative 
survival strategies to get the aid they require. On top of this, the refugees' fate is controlled by 
such things as organisations budgets and quality, public services, national and regional security 
and international developers priorities (Kelly, Timothy, and Leah 2016, 49). The refugees lose 
power over their own lives and left in someone else's hands. 
 This makes the power relation between the parties a skewed one, making the 
humanitarian organisations the definite most powerful actor within the settlement. It does not 
mean, however, that the refugees are weak or only has to follow. This will be shown throughout 







Empowerment through documents  
Reflecting the above international refugee apparatus, the refugees in Uganda are formally 
empowered majorly through three different acts or documents. I see empowerment similarly to 
how Page and Czuba (1999, Volume 37, Number 5) understand it, that; 
 
…empowerment is a multi-dimensional social process that helps people gain control 
over their own lives. It is a process that fosters power (that is, the capacity to implement) 
in people, for use in their own lives, their communities, and in their society, by acting 
on issues that they define as important. 
 
With this understanding of empowerment, the power has to be understood in relation to other 
parties in a power relation. This means countering other parties acts as the refugees deem 
important. When they are able to affect other parties' power in different situations, 
empowerment becomes that which makes one able to resist other parties' power. I argue that 
the central part of empowerment to the refugees in Uganda happens through a series of 
documents. Even though they were able to do many of the same things before these acts and 
laws were documented, it is now the documents and the knowledge of them that empowers 
them as they can now be referred to and used to gain control. Although refugees received 
farmland and were allowed to participate in the open market before, it was the Self-Reliance 
Strategy (SRS) that formalised it in 1999 (Kaiser 2006). Through these documents, the refugees 
understood their rights in Uganda. In 2006, the refugee act gave refugees the right to work and 
choose their place of residence by law. This meant that a family could always live together and 
gave them access to live outside any refugee settlement and work there as well. Lastly, in 2017 
the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) document renewed the SRS model 
from 1999. Although some of these models, acts and laws are new, their function pre-existed 
them, making that kind of treatment in Uganda a norm long before they were put on paper. For 
instance, when discussing land, ReHoPE (The World Bank 2017, 2) states that refugees are 
“allocated land for shelter and agricultural use”. Also, the refugee’s regulations (2010, 19) 
states that "A refugee who is residing in a designated refugee settlement or a refugee area shall 
have free access to use land for the purposes of cultivation or pasturing". ReHoPE further states 
that this is one of multiple "pathways" provided for the refugees to become self-reliant. 
Agricultural land and how it affects the refugees and the relations within the settlement will be 
discussed in detail below. Although documents such as ReHoPE are mostly unknown to the 




70/30 rule, which quickly became basic knowledge for most refugees. The understanding of 
these documents for most South Sudanese refugees is not something they have learnt just 
through experience for the last three years. Many of the South Sudanese refugees in Uganda 
has been refugees there before, in the 1990s. They therefore have experience as refugees and in 
Uganda specifically.   
Something particular for refugees in Uganda, is their free choice of residence giving all 
refugees the right for family reunions and live where they want. Although they are given a plot 
of land, they can decline to live there and move anywhere in Uganda if they wish (ReHoPE 
2017). Family reunion is very common among the refugees and those who do not live together 
know about each other and where the others live. Although the refugees are allowed to live 
where they want, most choose to stay in settlements where they have access to free food and 
water. Some choose to move to cities like Kampala, but this requires resources often combined 
with contacts. Being allowed to live where they want is a right that gives the refugees a power 
to leave and search for a better situation other places within the country as they wish (Kaiser 
(2006)Kaiser (2006)Kaiser (2006)Kaiser (2006)Kaiser (2006)Kaiser (2006)Kaiser 
(2006)Kaiser (2006)Kaiser (2006)Kaiser (2006)Kaiser (2006)Kaiser (2006). 
Giving refugees the right to work is a very empowering right. Although, in Bidi Bidi, 
very few refugees have regular contract work. Some people do contract work for organisations, 
but the large majority only work uncontracted for incentives. Such incentives can be phone 
money, bicycles, miscellaneous items such as rubber boots, flashlights, bags, rain cloths, small 
solar panels and other to use in the practice of the job they are told to do. These jobs can be part 
of the Village Health Team (VHT), neighbourhood watch, village leader or multiple other jobs. 
A few people can get a job as a nurse, teacher or with training for the organisations. These jobs 
are contracted and give a stable income, but it also has its limits. For both teachers and nurses 
working in Uganda, it is required that they have papers of education in Uganda standards and 
often requires that they are part of organisations for the specific professions. This makes it very 
difficult for refugees to compete for the same jobs as someone from Uganda. This result in 
refugees always receiving the lowest-paying jobs. A job, if only for incentives, can become a 
significant income for many, which often gives opportunities to achieve further incentives or 
pay. 
Mobility has been a privilege given to refugees for a long time in Uganda. Mobility 
gives the refugees power to partake in the economy, to settle and to produce. Mobility then 




though such as travelling back to South Sudan, which is illegal. This was a common practice, 
and although they knew, the humanitarian organisations, nor anyone else never report it.  
  These kinds of empowerment do not only result in the refugees being empowered 
separately but used in combination they result in people being able to speak up against what 
they deem unfair treatment. It is what gives the refugees an organisational form of power (Wolf 
1990) as discussed in the introduction. The power within these empowerments allows the 
refugees to be able to resist power within actions that might give results, and they can make a 
change. This empowerment, giving the refugees organisational power is in large part also what 
Schmidt (2003) argues, is the difference between a settlement and a camp. On top of 
empowerment through these documents, the refugees are, as I will show in chapter three, 
empowered through multiple institutions such as schools, health centres and courses.   
 
Land and Farming 
Refugees are placed in settlements all over Uganda, but the large majority is placed in Yumbe 
and Mojo Districts both bordering South Sudan. Although documents are stating that refugees 
are to receive land for the time they stay in Uganda, there is no mentioning of where or what 
quality of land, an issue well documented by Kaiser (2006). Yumbe district, where Bidi Bidi 
settlement is located has mostly leptosol soil with exceptions of plinthosol soil around rivers 
and in the south of the settlement where there swampy. Leptosol soil means that the earth is 
shallow and usually rocky. Plinthosol soil is mostly found in lower wet areas which also makes 
it better for farming. Mostly, the land in Bidi Bidi has a high acidic level, making it suitable for 
growing plants such as groundnuts and maize, but many root vegetables struggle. One can find 
people growing cucumber, passion fruit, papaya, tomato and okra, but these are rare. 
 
One day me and Isaac walked to a football game on the large football court at the 
bottom of the village. Isaac has a master's degree in agriculture and is one of the people 
who do best when it comes to plants and harvest. While walking there almost at the 
bottom of the settlement, he asks me "do you see anything different here from up where 
you and I live?" I look around, and the only thing I can see is maize about 2,5 meters 
high. I tell him that the only thing I see is maize. Which was true, all along the road, 
blocking the view to everything else there was maize. He laughed and said "exactly" up 
where we live people also grow maize, but they never become as high, and the cobs 
never become as large as down here. He says that this tank in the village is always the 






Figure 2. The map shows the different soils in Uganda. In the north-west, there is mostly 
Leptosol and Plinthosol soils which is where Bidi Bidi is located.8 
 
The village where I stayed is on a small hilltop in a larger wide valley. The hilltop is surrounded 
by two rivers, one to the east and one to the west, meeting in the north.  Because the village 
lays on top of a hill, the soil is mostly leptosol soil. It is hard and rocky and difficult to dig. This 
is experienced the hard way when digging latrines three meters deep, two meters long and one 
meter wide—which is the specifications everyone uses from the settlement authorities. The 
organisations give much of the tools used like hoes, but they rarely last much longer than two 
seasons, because of the hard soil that quickly wears them down.  
 
8 Picture source: Priorities for sustainable soil management in Uganda. A Presentation at The 
African Soil Partnership By Zakayo Muyaka, Assistant Commissioner, Soil & Water 





 One major issue that is rarely talked about by the refugees and the humanitarian 
organisations is the handling of trash which has a large effect on the land quality. Although 
most people throw their trash in pits called wasaka dili. The trash is either burned or covered 
with soil when the amount of trash is enough. Primarily the pits they close off is for the trash 
to rot to make soil. They therefore try to put only organic trash in it. The next planting season, 
they will dig the pit up again to plant mostly sweet potato. They rarely succeed in just throwing 
organic material, and the soil therefore often contains plastic. The refugees are aware of that 
plastic in soil might affect agriculture and plants, and they see it when digging up the pits. 
Although, they often do not remove the plastic before they start planting. I did hear some rumors 
about a garbage pilot program that was going to start, but I never heard anything more about it. 
 
A challenging climate and a difficult harvest 
The climate in Uganda mostly varies between rain season to dry season. In the south, these 
changes are quite regular, but in the north-west, the weather can be very difficult to predict. 
Rainy season can start in April, which is noticed by a drop in temperature, more wind from the 
east and more thunderstorms and rain. The drop in temperature can start in April with the 
combining winds, but it can be long between each thunderstorm and rain. 
 
While sitting under the tree in his household, I talked with the village leader, as we often 
did. Then he told me that the host community had told him that before the refugees 
arrived there had been multiple consecutive years where they had almost not received 
any rain. The year after the refugees arrived, there was an excellent rainy season with 
stable rainfall. They did not understand why it was so. 
 
The village leaders point in telling me this was that living in that area is not easy. Even though 
the rain did come when the refugees arrived, it was rather seen as a strange coincidence as the 
weather was so unpredictable. This has been proven in later years as rainy seasons has not been 
very stable, which has made digging and planting difficult work. This would be observed by 
the fact that timing for planting the first seeds varies greatly between farmers. Some can start 
planting once the first proper rainfall had come while others can wait for another month. Both 




Picture 2:  Tools used for digging latrines and graves get quickly worn down because of 




rain which will affect the harvest negatively, but then again, they will have the first maize on 
the market which they can sell for a higher price. Planting later when rains are more stable you 
can get a better harvest, but if they want to sell, they will have to do so at a market filled with 
others also selling maize. Then again you have the rare tomato planter, they are often able to be 
the sole provider of tomato in a village, but they also have their limits. For the lack of land, 
resources and workforce, the gains are nothing similar to those of Fredrik Barth's (1967, 171) 
“tomato man”. But, the person can be able to set a higher price for the tomatoes as the option 
for customers is to travel to larger markets or villages which can be far away.  
    Farming can be a difficult practice for the refugees, but one thing is probably doing more 
harm than any others, and that is plant diseases. Diseases attacking the maize and other 
vegetables start to infect vast amount of maize stalks moving from one field to the next. Without 
treatment, it can ruin the harvest for entire villages. The most common disease can be treated 
by throwing ash on each maize stalk. Some people do this, but for those who only have fields 
further away from their houses and rarely go to check on them, this disease can ruin their 
harvest. This is also a result of inexperience. The refugees are differing significantly in their 
prior experience in farming. Some have farmed their whole life, some are educated, some are 
self-thought, and some has never touched a hoe or a seed before. 
 
Isaac, who has a master's degree in agriculture, tells me multiple times that a farmer 
has to communicate with his plants, to see what they need and try to give it to them. He 
illustrates this by walking over to his maize stalks 2,5 meters tall, the tallest in the area, 
and looking at it, checking the leaves to see which ones are struggling and which ones 
are doing well. He then tells me that a farmer cannot just plant something and then turn 
their back on it, He shows this by just turning his back to his field and saying with a 
funny voice "I am a farmer". 
 
Isaac's illustration is not just for a laugh, people never checking on their fields cause damage to 
the plants, disease to spread and baboons taking a large amount of their harvest. Baboons are 
problems for many who has field further away from the village, and some has gone together in 
groups so they can change on who is guarding the field, a job often done by children. 
Nevertheless, baboons manage to get away with large amounts of maize. 
 The land quality and the other difficulties surrounding farming makes it for many a 
hopeless endeavour. Although Kaiser (2006) did fieldwork in northern Uganda before many of 




today. Some people have 5 min walk while others an hour to their farmland. The location of 
the settlement is also a large factor for the refugees' economic success as some can be located 
close to towns with large roads running through them and others far from any relevant 
infrastructure (Kaiser 2006). He also argues, as I have done in this chapter, that land quality 
differs in large degree in Uganda and can make a massive difference in living standard from 
one settlement to another. The differences can also be large within such a large settlement as 
Bidi Bidi. Even within a village, they can be considerable. All these factors make the income 
from agriculture incomparable to contracted jobs given by the humanitarian organisations. I 
will argue that the distribution of farmland to refugees in Uganda is a failed cadastralization 
since it is (The World Bank 2017)(The World Bank 2017)(The World Bank 2017)(The World 
Bank 2017)(The World Bank 2017)(The World Bank 2017)(The World Bank 2017)(The World 
Bank 2017)(The World Bank 2017)(The World Bank 2017)(The World Bank 2017)(The World 
Bank 2017) an implementation which was meant to be the same for everyone but instead 
resulted in people being unable to produce the same amount of food. Such differences make 
people jealous and angry, especially when humanitarian organisations are still expecting the 
same from them all. The injustice is cause for frustration among many refugees. 
Cadastralization will be further discussed in chapter three. 
 
The Household 
A few days after the refugees arrive in the settlement, they are asked how many they are in each 
family and how many want to live together. This is done after they arrive at their plot. If anyone 
there does not want to stay there anymore, the humanitarian organisations and OPM will find a 
new place for that family member to stay. The refugees are in this way organised into what the 
organisations call a "household". These organisational entities, households, can be huge and the 
biggest one I heard about comprised 40 people. Every person within that household is taken a 
picture of and given a registration number. They then all end up on the same paper, a paper 
called a biometric card which there is only one for each household with everyone on it. These 
papers are of vital importance for the refugees and losing one can be very troublesome. On 
these papers, it says that they are not valid as refugee IDs. However, that is what they are used 
for and accepted as by everyone, including humanitarian organisations and OPM. If your name 
and picture are on such a document, you are a refugee. 
 For the organisations these cards are what defines a household. Within each such 
household, there has to be a household head. Since they are given land to live on, it could be 




other places such as towns or even South Sudan with parts of the household staying behind in 
the settlement. Individuals with their own biometric cards can come and live with their family 
on their land but still have a biometric card of their own. The importance of these biometric 
cards becomes apparent when food is given out. When a household receives food, it does so 
measure by how many people there are on the biometric card. People who are on the card but 
not present in the settlement will still get their share, and people who are living with others but 
have their own card will get their own food.   
 "Household" is a word used by the humanitarian organisations and therefore also used 
by the refugees. I will argue that what the refugees are doing within a household, is dwelling 
which makes their houses on the land they are given also a dwelling. The houses they have on 
their land are built by themselves, and as Heidegger (1971, 4) argues “building is really 
dwelling”. He also continues to argue that “Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the 
earth” (1971, 4) while he also argues that humans do many things that are not dwelling, such 
as work, business and travel. For the refugees working is a part of building, when they work 
with the land or work to get money, they put the energy back into the building. Dwellers who 
are not present in the dwelling are also contributing to building by aiding with money or making 
sure the dwellers who are present get more food from the organisations by being on the 
biometric card. Heidegger (1971, 4) argues that “Building, as dwelling, unfolds in two ways: 
the building that cultivates and the building that erects structures." The refugees here do both 
by staying within the dwelling and continuously building upon it. The word household, 
however, does not include the social interactions and continuous building, not just a house but 
a life as dwelling does. The refugees stay within what has become a household, but which also 
is a dwelling. The understanding of a household is essential because within the institution lies 
many actions and possibilities which aids the refugees to build and therefore also to dwell. 
“Building is really dwelling", and everyone who is on a biometric card in some way aid a 
household in building, either their houses, bodies or lives.  Therefore, I will define a household 
as the place where a group dwells, but that contain people who may not be present but are on 
the biometric card. Because the biometric card determines the aid given to the refugees, it 
becomes what determines how much the people are able to build. The amount of people who 
dwells physically in a household and who aids in the dwelling does not have to be the same. 
Because of this, the biometric card is, as I will discuss later, also open for manipulation. This 
might contribute to more resources that can be used to dwell. By continually being able to dwell 
the refugees can empower themselves further. E.g. some can start to bake buns and sell them at 




they can become able to send children to better schools. This will empower them even further. 
Building their household is only possible because they are empowered, but through dwelling, 
the refugees can empower themselves further. 
 Issues such as cheating the biometric systems are well known by the humanitarian 
organisations and OPM. To get better control of the households, the humanitarian organisations 
have started a program for the VHT's where they go around to every household. They count the 
individuals who lives there, noting if anyone is sick and what kind of sickness they have. They 
also note if anyone is pregnant, if they have guests or if anyone has died. They then make 
weekly and monthly reports that they send to the organisations. Biometrics and VHT's and their 
contribution to cadastralization will be further discussed in chapter three.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed my presence in the settlement, how I managed to find my 
position there, and how I have been thinking about ethics while in fieldwork as well as in the 
writing process. I then presented the refugees, the international definition and how they are both 
given rights and disempowered through becoming refugees. I then narrowed in on refugees in 
Uganda and discussed different ways they are empowered. Arguing that through receiving land 
to live on and to farm, free mobility, freedom to choose their residence and freedom to work 
the refugees are empowered to such an extent as to have an organisational form of power. 
 I then moved on to discuss farmland and how the distribution of it in combination with 
the difficult climate makes a very uneven distribution of resources. Despite this, humanitarian 
organisations still expect the same production of food from everyone. I will argue that the 
distribution of farmland is a failed cadastralization as refugees are distinctively able to produce 
the same amount of food although that is the goal. 
 Towards the end, I discuss cadastralization of the refugees through the household. I 
argue that what is referred to as a household is actually a place of dwelling and that even though 
the refugees make it something they can call their own, they are still cadastralized through it. 
How the refugees are cadastralized and how they find ways to resist these actions are further 

































A struggle to be heard: Different forms of resistance for 
divergent goals 






It has been well established in anthropology that «resistance» can occur in many ways (See 
Scott 1985, Hollander and Einwhoner 2004, Abu-Lughod 2008). I will differ between two 
forms of resistance; First, resistance as a form of communication, and second, what I refer to 
as unintentional resistance. The unintentional resistance is irreducible to effect, acts without 
tangible effects or an instrumentality. In this chapter, acts will be discussed as a form of 
communication. This meaning that the acts themselves are sending a message. Whether the 
message is received correctly, or at all, depends on the relation between the parties. 
  From those that we can allocate a structural position of being weak or weakened – as in 
Scott's expression "weapons of the weak" – resistance is often exerted in hidden ways. Some 
ways cannot always understood by others as resistance, or even be noticed. Even though I argue 
for the refugee’s empowerment in chapter one, their resistance is not always heard or 
understood which becomes an issue. 
 I argued for an unconventional reading of resistance in the introduction. This chapter 
will continue that argument. I will show that based on my fieldwork material, the "usual" 
conceptualisation of resistance becomes one-dimensional when observing social-political 
movements. This depicts acts of resistance as if it is following the same patterns and that all 
resistors are oppressed. The "usual" conceptualisation of resistance also makes it seem like the 
relation between the parties is always similar. I argue in this chapter that this is not always the 
case, that resistance does not have to be observed as the resistance performed by an armed 
rebellion against a government or a mutiny on a ship. I will instead argue that all acts that 
challenge or remove whole or parts of the other party's power in a relationship of power are 
resistant. By defining resistance this way, the different aspects of the relation between the 
parties will become clear through analysing the committed acts. 
 I argue that the resistant acts are forms of communication. Therefore, it also has to 
follow the same criteria as other forms of communication, which make it possible to use some 
of the same theories. In this regard, Norris and Jones (2005, 126) argue that intersubjectivity, 
which is that which we presuppose as minimally shared when we participate in a conversation, 
has to be present. Says Norris and Jones (2005, 126): "This contract further concerns rules for 
role taking and intermeshing of participant goals and motives.". The first step to accomplish 
intersubjectivity, according to Norris and Jones, is to negotiate a shared situation definition. 
The situation definition is one party’s definition of a situation, their understanding of it. The 
situation definition is important because it is based on that the party assume the other party´s 




resistance can be noticed, i.e. in a meeting between two parties and their entire life worlds. 
Different situation definitions can therefore complicate situations as I will show.  
This chapter will discuss different ways resistant is acted out, why they are chosen and 
why they had the effect they did. I will also show how these acts are responded to by the 
humanitarian organisations and OPM. A point is that ignoring a resistant act can (and often 
will) only make the next act “louder” and more visible until the act is responded to, respectively. 
To understand the relation between these parties, we need to understand why some acts are 
noticed and why others are not,, giving us a better understanding of the relation between the 
parties by understanding the situation definition and possibly the intersubjectivity or lack 
thereof.  
 I will first present a case with an open form of resistance, how this is responded to and 
how the counter-responses are played out. It will illustrate both how Foucault's "acts upon acts" 
can be understood in a case study and how a misunderstanding of the situation definition can 
have serious consequences. The second, smaller case, will discuss how silent acts can also be 
resistant to communicative acts and how these acts are perceived and understood. I will discuss 
how the refugees´ empowerment is being attempted taken away and resisted by the 
humanitarian organisations and OPM with responsive actions—all which shapes the 
relationship between the two parties. 
 
A protest turned into a strike 
I was sitting with the village leader outside under some trees. I often visited him in his 
household. It is sunny and hot as always, but the trees offer shade, which helps. Around us, his 
ducklings are running, they are growing fast and are quick to eat anything that falls on the 
ground. He tells me that they need better access to water. Recently some of his ducks died from 
disease—a common problem afflicting both the refugees and the host community that keep 
livestock. His children are sitting around a bowl on a small table, eating. I ask him why one of 
the workers in one of the organisations told me that his village was the most uncontrollable. He 
immediately told me that it is not true. He then continued to tell me that his village has gotten 
that reputation because of a protest they arranged last year. I was intrigued, and asked him what 
it was about, he looked at me as if it was common knowledge. He then started to tell me about 






“The people in Kampala decided this. For us, it meant that we had to walk 5 kilometres 
one way to get our food.” He explained further, with an annoyed tone: "How can people 
walk 5 kilometres to get food? Many people here are old, and some have households of 
15 people in it, how can they expect people to walk 5 kilometres with that amount of 
food?” 
 
I calculate that a household of 8 people would equal roughly 135 kg in food from each food 
distribution. He continues as if going through an inventory of everything that was wrong with 
that scenario: 
 
the organisations were not willing to pay for any transport, and so we would need to 
sell food to manage the transport, which the organisations do not like. They do not 
understand that if we are moving so far from our house, who is going to protect the 
house? Can they guarantee that we are safe with all that food on our way home? What 
if we get robbed? Can they guarantee our security on the way home? There are so many 
old people, people with bad health, people who would not be able to get that food home. 
 
I then asked about the strikes, and he responded: 
 
We did not strike; we protested he told me. There were strikes, but people from this 
village did not take part. We were the once who started it: us and some neighbour 
villages. We got together and decided that we should protest. We wrote letters saying 
that we have decided to strike because they started to move the distribution sites. We 
sent letters to multiple organisations and the OPM and the district office. For the 
protest, we all agreed that there was to be no violence; it should be a peaceful protest. 
We walked up, many hundred people to the food distribution where we should have 
gotten the food. 5 kilometres away. We had made signs and slogans that we repeated 
all the way there, and for the time we were there. It all went really well, there was no 
violence, people kept calm, and we gave them the message. 
 
"How did the organisations react?" I asked.  
  
They did not show themselves and said that we were angry and wanted to hurt them. We 




few days later, a few other villages tried another protest. This was not so successful; 
they did not plan it as we did, and they ended up locking an officer in charge inside his 
car and let all the air out of the tires so he could not get away. They did not hurt anyone, 
but some things were stolen. 
 
I learnt later that this protest scared the organisations. Many aid workers did not come to work 
because of the situation. He then says that: 
 
The third one was the most serious, but that did not happen here, that was in Bidi Bidi, 
the centre of the settlement. There, refugees attacked a food distribution site, people 
stole a lot of food, radios, walkie-talkies, beat up some guards really bad. This made 
the organisations pull out of the settlement.  
 
A few days later, we got a message that they wanted to invite many of the leaders to a 
meeting. We all went there, even some of the religious leaders attended. At the meeting 
were organisation workers coming from Kampala. There, they asked us what the 
problem was.  
 
The village leader looked at me and said: 
 
It was almost like they never read the letters we sent. We had written everything there, 
but still, they asked us about it. We explained it to them again; all the reasons why 
moving the food distribution point did not work for us. One of the religious leaders told 
them in a speech that they should try to carry that amount of food for five kilometres 
and see how they would manage.  
 
A speech used by many others after him. An OPM representative who worked in the settlement 
told me that there had been large disagreements between the staff on the ground in the 
settlement and the people sitting in Kampala. However, these disagreements had started after 
the refugees started striking. Not long after the meeting, the food distribution was back to where 
it had been, where all the refugees wanted it, in their village. 
 These open resistant acts by the refugees are not committed to remove the humanitarian 




moving the FDP (Food Distribution Point) is not acceptable. This is also specifically stated by 
the village leader who organised the protest.  
 To understand the different actions which pursued we need to take a close look at 
intersubjectivity and the situation definition. In communication, one comment responds to 
another comment - like Foucault's "acts upon acts" - and so the conversation develops. The first 
act or comment quickly becomes the one that defines the situation – which sets the situation 
definition. However, intersubjectivity might not have been accomplished; acts might have been 
misunderstood or not received at all, which can cause the situation definition to change from 
that which the first actor intended. Intersubjectivity seems here like something that is or is not, 
but it should rather be understood as a continuum (Norris and Jones 2005). Intersubjectivity 
therefore exists when interlocutors share some aspect of their situation definitions. Typically, 
this overlap may occur at several levels, and hence several levels of intersubjectivity may exist 
(Wertsch 1985, 159). Also, intersubjectivity, as Norris and Jones (2005) argue, is between a 
small number of people. As I apply intersubjectivity within a settlement of almost 250 000 
people one cannot assume that intersubjectivity is accomplished for all people within the 
settlement. Various degrees of intersubjectivity will occur between different parties in different 
places within the settlement. This might also be why refugees can respond differently to the 
humanitarian organisations moving the FDP. 
 The surprised and angry response to the humanitarian organisations choice to move the 
FDP implies that the refugees did not have the same understanding of the situation as the 
humanitarian organisations did. Some of the anger is also based on the fact that the choice to 
move the distribution was not made by anyone who was in the settlement, but someone over 
500 kilometres away. The distance means that their situation definition in the settlement is 
based on entirely different criteria's than those present in the settlement. This is also shown 
through their lack of understanding the consequences of moving the FDP had to the refugees. 
 The organisations’ decision to move the food distribution almost five kilometres away 
from where they previously distributed was for the refugees an act outside the intersubjectivity 
between them and the humanitarian organisations and OPM. This act by the humanitarian 
organisation disrupt more than just the refugees’ situation definition for the specific situation, 
but the situation definition of the roles as refugees and humanitarian organisations.  
 The issue with situation definition is that it is not static and can change during a 
conversation or situation. The situation needs to continually be defined for all parties to make 
sure nothing is misunderstood. Within the settlement, the situation is rarely defined, and it 




 For the humanitarian organisations, the protests and strikes were acceptable acts since 
it was stated to be permitted in an international policy within UNHCR. For the refugees, 
however, even though they understand that the humanitarian organisations have structural 
power, they knew nothing about this policy which made the act less understandable. By 
conducting such an act, the situation definition changed for the refugees, although it had not 
yet changed for the humanitarian organisations and OPM. The refugees' actions would, 
therefore, be difficult to understand for the humanitarian organisations and OPM.  
Photo 4: A semi-permanent food distribution site for up to 5 villages. The site is controlled 
by the organisations with security forces and refugees aiding in the distribution of food. 
Photo: Mikko Virtanen 
 
 In terms of the initial typology of resistance introduced at the beginning of this thesis, 
we see that it falls clearly on the side of clear intent. Furthermore, the acts are not a hidden form 
of resistance, but open in terms of a message that was composed to be loud and clear. It is 
because of the intent, the common understanding of it, and how many are affected by the 
conflicting act of central food, that makes an open form of resistance to happen. The refugees 




acts. In this instance, the refugees refused to participate and instead delivered the message that 
what the organisations were doing was wrong. They had a purpose of their actions or as 
Hobsbawm (1971, 111) argues: 
 
The classical mob did not merely riot as a protest, but because it expected to achieve 
something by its riot. It assumed that the authorities would be sensitive to its 
movements, and probably also that they would make some sort of immediate 
concession; for the `mob` was not simply a casual collection of people united for some 
ad hoc purpose, but in a recognised sense, a permanent entity, even though rarely 
permanently organised as such. 
 
Just as Hobsbawm's mob, the two strikes were "organised", a mob with a goal. A group of 
people with the expectation of that their actions would receive a response from the humanitarian 
organisations and the consequences they wanted, although not organised, they did have a 
purpose with their acts. The gathering of a mob was, however, made possible by the 
empowerment discussed in chapter one as the refugees are free to move and can organise. The 
acts of the strikes, however, should not be mistaken as the same act as the protest, clearly stated 
by the village leader. The act of the protest was not an act by a casual collection of people, it 
was highly organised down to detail and to understand these acts as the same is to overlook the 
empowerment the refugees truly have. To make the same mistake which the humanitarian 
organisations are doing, to undermine the refugees' acts. Because of how the humanitarian 
organisations understood the refugees their response was to claim that the refugees were 
dangerous. This made the refugees and their acts something they were not. 
Because of the lack of desired response from the organisations, the refugees proceeded 
with escalating their actions. While the intent was still the same, the second and third act was 
very different. No letters were sent out to inform any parties, nothing was formally organised 
by the refugees, and things went more out of control in the sense of lacking a coordinating 
centre and violence was conducted. The message itself became more important than the way it 
was presented. However, while the message intended was that the central food distributions did 
not work for the stated reasons the message received was just that something was wrong, or 
even worse, that the refugees are dangerous. The parties had a very different situation definition. 
 As these acts escalated so too did the responses to them. The organisation workers 
responded with becoming scared, and many workers refused to do their jobs for fear of reprisals. 




the humanitarian organisations seemed to be surprised that the refugees could use that way. 
This resulted in the organisations responding with fear. This was not the intentions from the 
refugees. The situation escalated: The humanitarian organisations and OPM workers all pulled 
out of the park, responding with more fear and again little of the response the refugees wanted. 
The organisations then gathered leaders from the humanitarian organisations, OPM, and the 
refugees to discuss the situation. This turn of events meant achieving what the refugees wanted 
all along: to discuss the situation and to put a stop to the system of centralised food distribution. 
This story was told to me long after it happened, but still, it was told in incredible detail and 
involved strong feelings. For the refugees, the result is interpreted and conveyed as a victory as 
they forced the organisations to listen to them and to change how they work. Different aspects 
of these incidents are often mentioned in casual conversations, and when it is, it is often with a 
smile, frustration or even anger. For the organisation workers in the settlement, the incident is, 
perhaps surprisingly, not seen as a form of defeat but as a serious situation that should not have 
occurred. Only certain aspects of the narrative the refugees tell are, however, recounted by the 
workers—as in this narrative from a discussion between a OPM worker and a humanitarian 
worker whom I had the pleasure of sharing lunch with, in the settlement: 
 
I found myself in a discussion between workers from different organisations and OPM. 
They discussed what went wrong at the strike, I sat in my chair and listened as the 
discussion became louder and louder and a man started to stand up and shout. I noticed 
in the discussion that the only thing they discussed was the last strike where there was 
violence, and people got hurt. In a second of silence, I quickly asked everyone how many 
protests and strikes there was during that time. They all looked and me and became 
silent, the man standing up said that there was one. I asked them "what about the protest 
at the food distribution, where people refused to take food because of the distance, or 
the one where an officer got trapped in the car". They looked at me again, and one man 
said he had never heard about those. The standing man said that "those were no 
problem “because nothing happened there”.  
 
In narratives as this, the organisations are effectively exerting their power by erasing the 
refugees’ acts of resistance. This act not only shows how resistant actions are perceived but 
also portrays how a more powerful actor can still maintain their power by wilfully eclipsing 




what happens. The event is that which can be narrated. The event is situation organised by 
culturally situated meanings." (Feldman 2019, 14).  
However, there is no singular narration of the event of the protest and strikes and 
narrations becomes very different depending on which party one asks. Moreover, in this 
scenario, the form and amount of power the two parties have cannot be forgotten. Dismissing 
the very events, the other party holds great pride in becomes a resistant act as it undermines not 
just the act itself but the power of the other party. While the refugees are empowered in Uganda, 
they are also disempowered through such actions, where their actions can be reduced to nothing. 
The humanitarian organisations and OPM are in this way giving with one hand, while taking 
away with the other, resisting the very power they have given to the refugees. 
 For the refugees, the need to be heard and the frustration that they were not, made the 
protests turn into strikes. For the humanitarian organisations, these actions were surprising 
coming from the refugees. Based on her work with refugees from Burundi and Rwanda, Malkki 
(1996) argue that refugees are seen as unreliable informants regarding their history, that they 
are dehistoricized. She writes that the refugees become speechless emissaries as they are never 
trusted to tell their own story. Similar to how Malkki (1996) writes that humanitarian 
organisation workers see refugees as untrustworthy and that it is the organisation workers 
accounts that matter. It is the humanitarian organisations understanding of the situation that 
matters regarding events in the settlement as well. As Malkki argues the refugees become 
speechless emissaries. She argues that the refugees are seen as supposed to be helpless and look 
like it. When the refugees are empowered to move where they want, to take part in the global 
market and live where they want, are they really refugees? For the refugees in Uganda, the 
answer is yes, but still, they need someone to speak for them. But when the very people that are 
set to speak for them goes against them and ignores what they say, the frustration can become 
overwhelming, and strikes can occur. The humanitarian organisations become so secure in their 
work that they stop listening to the very people they try to help. Barnett (2004, 40)  argues that: 
 
Organisations vary greatly in the degree to which they receive and process feedback 
from their environment about performance. Those insulated from such feedback often 
develop internal cultures and procedures that do not promote the goals of those who 
created the organisation or those whom it serves. 
 
The act of putting a FDP 5 kilometres away from the people who receive the food is done by 




the them. The refugees become speechless as everything they say is ignored. Furthermore, they 
result to resistance to be heard by the people who are in charge and whom they depend on. 
Harrell-Bond (2002, 55) writes that the humanitarian workers are in an asymmetrical 
relationship with the refugees. She continues by saying that the refugees are symbolically 
disempowered by the very people whom they depend on survival and security.  
 Although the refugees are empowered to make a better life for themselves, Malkki 
(1996, 388) argues that “This vision of helplessness is vitally linked to the constitution of 
speechlessness among refugees: helpless victims need protection, need someone to speak for 
them.” As the refugees are made speechless, they are also made helpless, lessened into people 
without power. While being seen as helpless, they lose their voice to the very people who are 
in power to speak for them. They are made no more than refugees, without anything to their 
name. Even empowered to move freely, to farm, to have land and to live where they want, they 
are reminded that they are still speechless refugees. 
Photo 5: The refuges working together with people from the organisations to set up a food 
distribution close to a village. The refugees are doing the heavy work while the 




A speechless resistance 
In August 2019, the village leader was invited to a meeting between all the leaders in 
the zone under a large tree at the police station. This meeting was going to address 
some specific issues that were going to be presented for the humanitarian organisations 
and OPM by the refugee zone leader. I immediately asked my village leader if I could 
attend the meeting with him, although I knew he was going to ask me if I wanted to come 
with him, as he always did. We drove my motorbike to the meeting, only a five minute 
drive away, on a bumpy sandy road. There, at the meeting, many of the village leaders 
were already sitting on plastic chairs. Multiple people were still missing, and I think as 
always that this is just how time works here. I had finally gotten a bit used to this after 
having at this point spent almost five months there. This time, it was different. Usually, 
the organisers of the meeting would wait for a bit to see if people show up, but not now. 
This time, they started on time. Multiple issues are coming up: an organisation has been 
choosing their participants for a new project wrongfully, and many of the leaders are 
complaining. What was meant to be close to the end of the meeting dragged on, and 
then the last subject started. It was about participation from village leaders in zone 
meetings. At these meetings OPM, all humanitarian organisations and all villages are 
supposed to be represented. 
  One of the respected village leaders were sitting in his chair while everyone was 
silent, shaking his head. He then stretch out his hand and does not wait to talk; he 
exclaims, in anger, that he does not attend those meeting because they [the village 
leaders]are not listened to. He claims they are not cared about. He then continues with 
saying: "It is difficult to get to these meetings for them, the meetings last for almost five 
hours without any food, anything to drink and no transport money for them." He then 
says that they know that what they say is never included in the minutes. "Why should we 
attend?" All the leaders agreed with him and claimed that that was why none of them 
participated in the meetings. The village leader in charge then said that if that was why 
no one attended, then that had to be told to OPM and the humanitarian organisations 
because it seemed like they had not gotten that message or understood their actions in 
that way.  
  At the next zone meeting, only a few days later under the same tree at the police 
station almost all of the village leaders also attended. As all zone meetings do, this one 
also started about one hour later than what it was supposed to. When enough people 




were given a specific time to talk as well as the village leader representing all refugees 
in the zone. When it was his turn, he spoke over time. This made the officer from OPM, 
who led the meeting, angry and told him to sit down and stop talking. This incident 
managed to overshadow everything the village leader tried to say. Later in the meeting, 
the issue was taken up again, and this time it was heard and responded to. Both the 
officer from OPM and some from UNHCR said that they will have to see further on this 
issue and that the participation from the village leaders was very important to them. 
 
ReHoPE (2017) states that refugee leaders are to be voted forward where their job is 
peacebuilding efforts between the different parties. In South Sudan, there are roles of the village 
leaders but also that of the chief. Their roles are to mediate disputes within their community 
(Fadlalla 2009). In South Sudan, their role within local communities is put down I law by the 
Chiefs' Courts Ordinance 1931, making their role within the community formal (Fadlalla 2009). 
The village leader is elected for two years in the settlement, while chiefs in South Sudan are 
appointed by the rest of the clan, based on the fathers' practice as chief, as explained to me in 
the settlement. Being village leaders in the settlement is an unpaid role and one that takes much 
time with leaders only receiving incentives in return.  
  Meetings between the village leaders in a zone are not common and usually only 
happens when there are large or urgent subjects to discuss. These meetings are also initiated by 
the village leaders alone, and no one else attends. The leaders are highly capable of organising 
themselves, but actions such as not going to the zone meetings are individual decision although 
acted out based on the same reasons.  
 As I attended zone meetings often, I knew that there were only one or two village leaders 
who attended them, and the subject of their absence was rarely talked about in any of the 
meetings. When it was addressed, however, it was usually in the form of complaints about them 
not being there. The village leader role is essential in keeping the people together and to make 
sure things are evenly distributed in the villages, and to keep the refugees organised. However, 
although the jobs are not paid, they are expected to do them well and without complaints. Many 
village leaders feel their job is not appreciated enough by the humanitarian organisations and 
that they are not listened to and respected, as shown in the case above. 
 The act of not attending zone meetings was not organised but was accomplished through 
unspoken mutual agreement between the leaders. The refugees only organised after it was taken 
up among them, although the act had been going on for many months. These acts had little 




wrong at the meetings. The humanitarian organisations and OPM at the meetings had been 
neglecting the very act of not participating and reduced it to laciness, a common view of the 
refugees in Bidi Bidi. As the meetings went on without almost any village leaders participating, 
the view of them not caring for their job grew, and an understanding that there might be another 
reason seemed far from their understanding of the situation.   
 (Geertz 1978, 32) discuss the social actions of bargaining at a bazaar in Morocco he 
writes that: “The whole structure of bargaining is determined by this fact: that it is a 
communication channel evolved to serve the needs of men at once coupled and opposed.” 
Similar to the bargaining at the market in Morocco, space which is created by empowering the 
refugees has created a communication channel. A way for both parties to communicate, but not 
just with voices, but with acts, resistant acts. With these acts, the parties are, in a way, 
bargaining for a solution to what one or both of them see as a problem.   
 
The parties here are both also coupled since both parties need each other and at the same 
time are opposed to each other. In relation to such a situation, Harrel-Bond (2002, 56) 
therefore comments: “Aid - the need for it and the responsibility to distribute it? is the 
unifying principle that binds these diverse actors together.” However, even though the 
refugees are empowered, they will not be able to challenge the humanitarian 
organisations as they constantly disempower them, as stated by Harrell-Bond: whether 
or not they are aware of it, humanitarian workers stand in an asymmetrical relationship 
to refugees who are symbolically disempowered through becoming clients of those 
upon whom they are dependent for the means of survival and security. (Harrell-Bond 
2002, 55).  
 
Thus, while an empowered refugee is still a refugee, what their empowerment has accomplished 
is not making them equal to others. Instead, they have found use in the empowerment to resist 
and communicated what they understand as unjust actions, although the humanitarian 
organisations often resist this voice. 
 
Conclusion 
As I have shown through mainly two cases in this chapter, resistance must, in the context of the 
Bidi Bidi settlement be analysed as comprising many additional dimensions than merely being 
simple acts to oppose oppressive parties through hidden acts. Resistance here becomes a form 




for the parts to communicate correctly and for there to be an intersubjectivity between the 
parties. 
 Leblanc (1999) argues that resistance is something that is exerted by the oppressed. I 
argue instead that resistance are acts enacted by any party with the result of challenging or 
reducing another party's power. This is shown by the humanitarian and OPM workers 
discussion of what happened at the protest and strikes, as well as reducing their act of not 
showing up at meetings to pure laziness. Reducing the refugee's power by undermining their 
acts, as Scott (1985) and Abu-Lughod (2008) argue, are deemed resistant acts. 
 The cases make it clear that the form of resistance is determined by the act and power 
it counters and opposes and is, thereby, a dynamic entity. Furthermore, as an act upon an act, 
acts of resistance are determined by the intersubjectivity for that specific situation. Changing 
the situation definition without maintaining intersubjectivity can have serious consequences 
such as the distribution of aid stopping because of the refugee’s violent actions which they 
deemed necessary.  
 I here also argue that some of the issues between the parties are that they do not just 
lack intersubjectivity but also lack and understanding of each other's power. I understand this 
from the humanitarian organisations' reaction to the refugees when they started protesting and 
striking. In the situation violence was not possible based on the humanitarian organisation's 
situation definition; aid workers therefor became afraid of the situation and what could come 
next. They therefore refused to continue work until the situation was solved.   
 For the humanitarian organisations, the refugee's empowerment goes against what a 
refugee is supposed to be. Because of this, their situation definition of the entire refugee 
situation is very different from the refugee´s situation definition. For the refugees, using once 
empowerment and testing its limits seem to be understood as their right and helps understand 
how their empowerment can further aid them in their situation as a survival strategy. 
 The responses to the refugees' actions also have to be within the intersubjectivity so as 
not to escalate the situation. For the humanitarian organisations and OPM not responding to a 
situation or ignoring it might be understood as within the intersubjectivity, but as Foucault 
(1982, 789) argues what defines a relationship of power is an action upon action. Not acting is 
also an act, but depending on the importance of the case, the other party is then forced to commit 
an even stronger and "louder" resistant act to force the wanted response. In the case of moving 
the food distribution sites, the acts of resistance became too loud and stepped outside the 






























Chapter 3  
The governed people and the acts of resistance 
Picture 6: Because of the fear and threat of Ebola, self-hunted or so-called “bush meat” 
was forbidden within the settlement. Nevertheless, such meat was still sold and eaten, even 






Controlling its people is an act consistently attempted by governing parties. In this chapter I 
will first discuss how governmentality, as Foucault (2009) delineate it, is acted out by the 
humanitarian organisations and OPM. I will present different disciplinary mechanisms and 
argue for how they shape the refugees. Also, I will describe how the humanitarian organisations 
and OPM are able to govern through them. From there I go on to discuss how cadastralization, 
in addition to governmentality, is used within the settlement. 
 Scott (1998) argues that in large part state powers has cadastralized societies to increase 
production and made it easier to collect taxes and an easily controllable system. 
Cadastralization becomes that which makes the gathering of knowledge easier and, therefore, 
facilitates governing. Within the settlement knowledge about the refugees becomes essential to 
improve the humanitarian organisations distribution of aid. Cadastralization, in this way, does 
not have to be something negative, but it can, as I will discuss, have unthought-of consequences.  
 In this chapter, I will present a case where refugees register to live in the settlement. 
The case shows how the refugees are controlled through biometric scanning and what it requires 
of the humanitarian organisations to maintain such a controlling system. The chapter also 
presents how the refugees adapt and can use such a system to resist the humanitarian 
organisations, and at the same time as a survival strategy. I will end by discussing the upsides 
and downsides of biometric and how it results in dehistoricization.  
 Biometrics is one of several ways cadastralization happen. One is how the land they live 
on is divided up as explained in the introduction. Scott (1998) argues that this is done to ease 
the collection of taxes. In the settlement it is done to improve aid and to make each and every 
one equal to the other. The whole settlement is constructed with the improvement of aid in mind 
and the structures cares little of identity and background of the people living there, where they 
come from, what they have experienced or what culture they carry with them. I will therefore 
discuss how the refugees participate in cadastralizing actions such as counting each household 
and keeping account of how many are pregnant, sick and what kind of sickness they have. By 
doing this, they participate in maintaining the cadastralizing system. I will use examples from 
the so-called VHT (Village Health Team) that were undertaking this task on behalf of the 
humanitarian organisations. I will further discuss the potential consequences of such 
cadastralization on the refugees.  
 Within such a social scramble of governmentality and cadastralization there are few 
responses more natural than resistance. After discussing certain aspects of cadastralization I 




other resistant acts which are meant to restrict their acts and thereby their power. As these acts 
change, the power changes and so, too, do the relations. 
 
Governmentality  
Governing masses of people is a difficult task and in the context of refugees this has often 
resulted in them being placed in refugee camps where they are constantly controlled and 
restricted—a process Liisa Malkki (1995a) has documented very well. In Uganda they 
explicitly aim for making the refugees self-sustainable (The World Bank 2017). But is that the 
only thing they might accomplish when aiming for it? I will argue that they also achieve a form 
of governmentality. By governmentality Foucault (2009) refers to the relation of power 
amongst the state and its people, making people able to govern themselves the way they, the 
government, wants. This form of governing happens through what Foucault (2009, 5) calls 
disciplinary mechanisms. He argues that: 
 
The disciplinary mechanism is characterized by the fact that a third personage, the 
culprit, appears within the binary system of the code, and at the same time, outside the 
code, and outside the legislative act that establishes the law and the judicial act that 
punishes the culprit, a series of adjacent, detective, medical, and psychological 
techniques appear which fall within the domain of surveillance, diagnosis, and the 
possible transformation of individuals.  
 
Within the settlement these disciplinary mechanisms are such institutions as schools, health 
centres, distribution of food and other miscellaneous and job training and courses. Through 
governmentality the refugees are empowered as well as pulled into a power relation. The 
refugees then attempt to use the empowerment while at the same time are being transformed by 
the institutions and the very empowerment they are given. Mbembe (2001, 133) argues that; 
 
The real inversion takes place when, in their desire for a certain majesty, the masses join 
in the madness and clothe themselves in cheap imitations of power to re-produce its 
epistemology, and when power, in its own violent quest for grandeur, makes vulgarity 
and wrongdoing its main mode of existence. (Mbembe 2001, 133) 
 
In Mbembe’s vision, this is where the people, the refugees are brought into or, better, 




think they are clothed, the refugees are transformed, but that transformation is often not the 
transformation they want. They are forced, by lack of choices, to participate in the systems that 
have been constructed for them. This is because disciplinary mechanisms make a population 
able to govern themselves, but to be able to do that the populace require knowledge where 
power follows. This power is meant for the people to govern themselves but can at the same 
time be used to resist other parties. This becomes part of what the refugees brings to the 
interface as argued for in the introduction.  
The refugees are able to achieve what Nielsen (2011) calls inverse governmentality; 
they are able to shape the way they are governed by the humanitarian organisations. They 
achieve this by using their knowledge and power, to resist the humanitarian organisations and 
OPM. Nielsen (2011) argues that governmentality happens through being governmentalized 
and then start acting to shape the very way they are governed by countering the governments 
acts and adapt to the governmentality so that they are able to change the governing actors.  
 Another theory that is often applied when discussing aid, is the developmentality that 
Lie (2015) argues for. Developmentality builds on the theory of governmentality but refers to 
the relation between donors and the receivers of aid. Lie (2015) argue that receivers of donor 
money are governed by the donors. As long as they spend the funds the way the donors intend, 
they are free to do as they want. Donors have to understand what the receivers want, and so 
govern in a way which makes the receivers of aid money seem to act out of their free will. This 
aspect works very well when discussing development on a macro level in Africa. Still, it 
becomes insufficient when one wants to do discuss aid on a micro level. This is because 
developmentality has little space for disciplinary mechanisms. In developmentality the 
diciplinary mechanisms are based on “auditing, accounting, monitoring and evaluation” (Lie 
2015, 33). However, Lie (2015) has some arguments for using developmentality and not 
governmentality. First Lie argues that “Foucault wrote about governmentality emerging as an 
effect of European state formation.” (Lie 2015, 36), and that the relation between parties is 
made with much more intention than in governmentality. This is true, for the parties at a macro 
level. However, the refugees are not informed that such actions of control are in motion and 
that such effects are intentional. Although, the parties within the settlement are different from 
that of a state and its people, but the relation is less similar. Lie (2015) further argues that 
developmentality removes the focus of the state power and state centrism. This is however one 
of my points, that the humanitarian organisations and OPM takes on the role of the governing 




 By harbouring and deploying such forms of what could be labelled governmentality, 
the humanitarian organisation achieves a settlement population that experience feeling more 
free and more empowered. At the same time, it is the empowerment they are given through the 
institutions that makes them able to act resistant. This makes them able to achieve inverse 
governmentality as Nielsen (2011) argues for. Therefore, it results in a relationship where acts 
always has to be met with counter acts and where each sides power has to be resisted in some 
way or another by the other parties. By doing this, they are able to achieve a settlement 
population which is governed and who’s power is constantly countered. A refugee population 
that has knowledge and knows how and are able to act.  
 It is important to note that the government in this case, the humanitarian organisations 
and OPM, do not lose their meaning when discussing governmentality. The government state 
their power by being the party that holds the information, the party that decides right from 
wrong. By portraying themselves as the keepers and the controlling party of this knowledge 
through such institutions the government stays in control and are rarely questioned. The 
relations within the settlement become shaped by this. The refugees and host community 
become those who should simply follow and accept, and the humanitarian organisations and 
OPM are those who govern. As Lie (2015, 35) argue, it is in the interface between these actors 
that resistance can be identified, where they can be seen deviating from the systems created to 
shape them. 
 Foucault (2009) states that governmentality is a good thing and important when 
governing. When Foucault discuss this theme, it is about the matter of the state and power. In 
a state, these actions evolve over generations, schools change, institutions evolve, and people 
are transformed with them through generations. In the settlement it is not like that. When a new 
form of governmentality is thrust upon people, it is often a form they are not used to. Among 
the refugees, some are not used to be governed.  They are not used to sending their children to 
school, going to a doctor when they are sick, and only effected by the governing of the church. 
For them the rapid changes in a refugee settlement can be hard to accept. Their responses to 
being governed is often resistance, especially in locations where refugees who never have been 
governed are the majority.  
 
The disciplinary mechanisms 
The institutions where governmentalization happens through, transforms the refugees slowly 
into people who can take part in governing themselves. These institutions, schools, health 




are also as argued earlier a large part of why the refugees come to Uganda specifically. By 
holding such institutions, the humanitarian organisations act as the ones holding the correct 
knowledge and that it is their role to teach it to the refugees. Foucault (2009, 100) argue that: 
 
The wisdom required of someone who governs is not exactly the wisdom of tradition, 
in the form of the knowledge of human and divine laws, of justice and equity, but rather 
wisdom as, precisely, the knowledge of things, of the objectives that can and must be 
attained, and the “disposition (disposition)” one must employ in order to attain them: 
this is the knowledge that constitutes the sovereign’s wisdom. 
 
These Institutions becomes a place where the humanitarian organisations show that they are the 
ones holding important knowledge and at the same share it in a way the refugees can use it to 
govern themselves. I will here show how these institutions are used by the refugees and what 
impact it has on them. I will show how the refugees contest some of the institutions since not 
all knowledge is held by the humanitarian organisations.  
 As explained in the thesis introduction, schools are an important factor for the South 
Sudanese refugees to come to Uganda. Many grownups have education from Uganda and 
knows the system. It is also a place where the schools are in English which they prefer to the 
French being taught in DRC. They also view the schools in Uganda of higher quality. School 
and education are also held in high regard and so quality education is important for them.  
 In the settlement the schools are placed in, or close to, all villages, they are run by both 
Uganda national teachers as well as South Sudanese refugee teachers. All who do not have a 
proof that they have finished primary school are able to become a student, no matter what age 
they are. There are many adults who also attend different courses to get their diploma. Because 
many lost all their documents in South Sudan there has been launched a 3-year program for 
people who claim to have finished school in South Sudan called AEP – Accelerated Education 
Program. In the program they are able to take 10 years of school in 3 years instead. This has 
resulted many to return to school.  
 The schools in the settlement are running on the Ugandan curriculum, which makes 
everyone exposed to the same teachings as everyone else in Uganda. This is an excerpt from 
my fieldnotes regarding this: 
 
When I heard this, I asked one of my 14-year-old friends if she knew what SPLM – 




talking many other children came over as well. They all said that they had never heard 
of SPLM which to me was very surprising since SPLM is in many ways what made South 
Sudan split from Sudan and plays a large part in their nation’s history. They told me 
that they don’t learn about South Sudan in school, mostly just Ugandan history.  
 
 
Photo 7. The village school. Photo: Mikko Virtanen 
 
The refugees are in this way forgetting their nation’s history and they are socialised into the 
Ugandan nation, although most have no wish to become Ugandans. Schools take a large part as 
a disciplinary mechanism as it teaches people what is right and wrong, and it decides what 
knowledge the people should have and gives them tools to use it. In this instance however it is 
a Ugandan school system teaching South Sudanese people what to know and how to use that 
knowledge. 
 Another issue with the teachings in the schools is that its only 1-3. Grade that has 
translated teachings. After that the teacher assume that everyone understands English, but many 




But then again, it is contradicted by the fact that everyone has to repeat a grade if they do not 
pass the exam for each grade.  
 Often close to schools lies Early Childhood Development (ECD) centres which takes 
care of young children with war traumas which today, 3 years after their arrival, has taken on a 
role more similar to a kindergarten. The ECD has both refugee volunteers and organisations 
workers working there and aid families with taking care of their children while they are farming 
their land or have troubles with traumatized children. Many children who go to school also 
attend ECD since there is a large playground and the children has access to games as long as 
they are supervised by grownups. ECD takes on a role as a free space for children. A place 
designed for them to refocus from what they have gone through. It also makes it easier for them 
in their everyday lives and increase their learning in school.  
  Health centres (HC) are spread out all over the settlement and usually close to the 
villages. They give all kinds of health services and refer people to larger centres or hospitals if 
they are not able to treat them locally. Even though the service is appreciated by the refugees, 
there are many who oppose them. There are for instance often programs telling refugees to go 
to the HC to give birth, but still, many people refuse to do it. A Village Health Team (VHT) 
worker who had been at been at a meeting addressing this specific problem explained six 
reasons why women gave birth at home. The first was that the distance to the HC was often to 
long for the women. This issue has been addressed multiple times by the humanitarian 
organisations. They argue that from the time the women notice that the birth has started, they 
all should be able to get to the HC if they go straight away. The problem appears when they 
want to do it at home and then something complicates the birth and they have to get to the HC 
in the middle of the birth. This is a recurring issue. The second reason is that women claim that 
they are abused at the HC, getting complaints of how dirty and disgusting they are from the 
nurses. Many women complain that they are not well treated at the HC, especially when giving 
birth. A third point was that the expected due date was forgotten. Nothing was therefore 
prepared for the birth and if the women then go to the HC they receive scolding from the nurses 
which they do not like. A fourth issue is that sometimes the HC have large lines and the women 
has to wait in line to give birth and they are not taken care of while waiting. A fifth issue is that 
many women have a tradition of cutting the umbilical cord in a special way. Many women have 
reported that the nurses do not listen to them when they say how they want it and that the nurses 
cut it wrong. The final reason is that the women claim that they for many years have been given 
birth at home in South Sudan. They therefore do not see why they should start going to the HC 




 When it comes to the refugee’s health, it can be difficult for the humanitarian 
organisations to convince the refugees that medical health personnel at the HC are those with 
the best medical competence. The refugees have through experience, rumours, local doctors 
and others built their own knowledge of how to take care of their own health and even if they 
do go to the HC and receives medicine it is often combined with local herbs. Therefore, also 
the refugees are keepers of knowledge. 
 Refugees often participate in job training and other courses. The courses might be 
parental courses, courses in prevention of domestic violence, neighbourhood watch training and 
many more. For job training courses there are put up multiple training centres throughout the 
settlement where they are doing what they call Accelerated Learning Program (ALP). This 
program usually goes over 6 intensive months where one can learn all basic knowledge within 
a profession. They can choose between mechanic, plumbing, tailoring and hairdressing, 
depending on the training center. There are also other courses available at some of the larger 
centres. When finished they get a diploma which makes it possible for them to get a job within 
that profession. However, some problems occur when the training is finished. Some of the goal 
for these courses is for the refugees to get a job, but there are to many educated in each 
profession compared to the amount of work available .Previously there were also another issue 
where ten people had to share on one set of tools. They then ended up with splitting the toolkits 
since many of the people in each group lived in different villages. This made everyone unable 
to fix anything completely. This issue was however fixed later, when another organisation took 
over the training and managed to give each person their own toolkit. 
 Other courses are more focused on handling issues within the settlement, problems 
observed by the humanitarian organisations and OPM. These courses can be about teaching 
men how to better take care for their wife and family, courses directed directly towards domestic 
violence, teaching both men and women “correct” behaviour in their houses. The courses can 
be about how to act when one is patroling in neighbourhood watch or something as complicated 
as how people can set up their own business. Courses like this are very popular. 
 By being the ones that hold the information and knowing how to use it, the humanitarian 
organisations are stating that they are the ones who are governing the refugees. As they share 
this knowledge they are also shaping the refugees. Foucault argues that “one who governs, 
should govern only in a way such that he will consider himself and act as if he were in the 
service of those who are governed.” (Foucault 2009, 100). The humanitarian organisations are 
sharing information with the intent of service to the refugees. An OPM officer told me when 




I see this as a statement that the organisations experience that they have shaped the refugees 
after their own opinion of what is “correct” behaviour.  
 In addition to these institutions, the humanitarian organisations are also able to show 
that they are those who is governing by controlling the FDP´s and distribution of other material 
goods, like soap. The refugees have to listen and follow the system the humanitarian 
organisations set up to receive what they need. Because of the importance of these resources, 
most refugees feel they have little choice but to do whatever they are told although some result 
to tricking and cheating the systems as I will come back to in chapter three. 
 The distribution of food or other necessary items functions as a disciplinary mechanism. 
The refugees are being taught what is expected of them, such as waiting in line, or not stealing 
or cheating. Such acts are often getting reported by the refugees themselves, which is an 
example of how they are governing themselves. Foucault (2009, 122) argues: 
 
When one speaks of a town that governs itself (see gouverne), and which is governed 
on the basis of its drapery, it means that people get their means of subsistence, their 
food, their resources, and their wealth from drapery. It is not therefore the town as a 
political structure, but the people, individuals, or group. Those whom one governs are 
people.  
  
The refugees do not have any such resource of their own and therefor lack the chance to govern 
themselves and are only able to do that through governmentality. Their main source of 
subsistence is the humanitarian organisations and are therefore governed by the humanitarian 
organisations. People governed by people, on the basis of resources. 
 
The churches  
In between all the infrastructure and outside of the control of the humanitarian organisations, 
the refugees have put up churches. Some are made of the same dried mud bricks as all other 
houses and others just a roof of grass on poles. The largest of these buildings can fit over 100 
people. There are five of these churches in the village I stayed in. Most people in the village 
follow the Anglican church, followed by the Catholic church. In South Sudan it is the other way 
around, with the Catholic church being the largest, followed by the Anglican church. They are 
followed by the Pentecostal, Charismatic and Baptist in that order. The Baptist being so small 
that only 5-10 people attend every Sunday. It is not possible to document the exact numbers of 




house. Many say something like “it does not matter which one you go to, it’s all to the same 
God”. Even though there are Muslims as well in the village there are no mosques. This is 
because there are quite few Muslims in the village, and they cannot afford building one. They 
have therefore received permission to pray in the local mosque with the host community.  
 The churches are an institution where the humanitarian organisations don’t take any 
part. They are built entirely by the refugees, without aid from any humanitarian organisation, 
except for requesting the space from the OPM. They are completely run by the refugees 
themselves and are often part of a larger system of churches far outside the refugee settlement. 
This could be connections to the structures within the catholic church.  
 Although they are run by the refugees, the churches as physical structures also get used 
for more than religion. Most meetings with humanitarian organisations and OPM are held in 
the churches. They are also where the organise and have their own meetings. As these churches 
are controlled by the refugees, they become a space where the refugees are able to come 
together and share ideas, which often has nothing to do with the church. Therefore, the churches 
become a space for organising resistance toward other actors. This is the case for many cases 
of restistance in this thesis. 
 





Today is the day of registration and re-registration. This means it is a chance for the refugees 
to alter their biometric cards and fix any issues with it. Such issues can be adding or removing 
a person to it, making a new one if it is lost or solve system errors which can occur. Registration 
and re-registration took place at the police station. When I arrive the area is filled with people 
in a large, crowded circle. A woman from OPM is standing in the middle and explains what is 
going to happen and how the things are done. She takes a few questions from the crowd before 
they start working. The registration is a continuous process done by OPM with the aid from 
UNHCR. It goes from zone to zone and assist people in fixing any problem they might have with 
their biometric cards or biometric profiles. The registration last 3-4 weeks to finish everything. 
I get a chair inside one of the houses and sit next to two officers on computers receiving refugees 
and their issues. Just beside me sits a translator who is a refugee, ready to translate the 
conversation. First, a man enters that claims he needs a new biometric card because his house 
burnt down; he shows a police report as proof. The officer finds the man in the system and 
prints out a new card for him.  
Next are two men who explain that one of them is the household head and the other 
comes from another settlement. He wants to move to this settlement and to the other man’s 
household. The officer asks if he has the document from the office in his original settlement, the 
man says, he doesn’t have them. The officer tells him that he has to go back to get them before 
he can do anything. The two men leave with sad looks on their faces and move outside. I later 
find the two men again and ask them about the settlement he comes from; he tells me it is the 
Rhino camp. The settlement is about a one-hour drive away and is difficult and expensive to 
get to.  
The next family that arrives is a mother and two children. She says that she needs to 
register her baby. The officer looks at her and looks at the baby. He then asks her, repeatedly, 
if this is, in fact, her baby. The mother replies yes, repeatedly. The officer makes the translator 
ask the older sister if the baby is her brother and she say yes. The officer sends her to the other 
office where they can take pictures and tells her to come back to him after she has done that. I 
understand that the officer asked the mother multiple times because she know how common it 
is to borrow other people’s babies to register them to get more food. Young babies can’t have 
their fingerprint or eyes scanned and only picture taken which makes them easy ways to trick 





Biometrics or biometric scanning is when each person in a group or category, usually in a 
defined space, is identified by their fingers print and/or iris. Each person has them scanned and 
put into a personal profile and will therefor always be identified through it. Jacobsen (2015) 
argues that this system becomes what decides who gets aid and who does not. A disciplinary 
mechanism which contributes to governmentality (Foucault 2009) as argued above. If a person 
is not in the system, there are few situations where a refugee is still able to argue for the right 
of aid. Jacobsen (2015) also argues that the system is “contributed to rendering the digitalized, 
newly accessible and newly traceable body synonymous with the kind of body to be regarded 
as deserving of humanitarian protection” (Jacobsen 2015, 159). Biometrics becomes a part of 
the cadastralization of the society. It becomes a form of cadastral mapping of people. The intent 
is to keep a form of control and to simplify decision making. These decisions can be who will 
receive aid or not. Some of the consequences of biometrics is that the refugee become a number 
who receives aid, rather than an individual. Harrell-Bond (2002, 56) argues that refugees are 
heterogeneous by such aspects as age, education, gender and social class. She continues with 
how the distribution of aid equalizes them. They are all equally inferior to those who are in 
control of the distribution of aid. Biometrics emphasizes this homogenisation as people become 
profiles which is validated by a computer program. I noticed this especially through the food 
distributions. Here, all refugees are treated equally at a systemic level. 
 It takes a lot of recourses from OPM and UNHCR to maintain a biometric system as it 
is a constant process. This is the price to pay if one wants an up to date information on all 
refugees within the settlement. Although time consuming, gathering this information has 
become simpler as refugees come to the mobile offices when they are present in each zone. The 
consequences of not being registered means that they lose right to receive aid. However, it is 
more important to the humanitarian organisations that the registration is done correctly, rather 
than that they receive food. You see an example of this with the two men mentioned earlier 
who had to go back. Maintaining the system becomes more important than the need of the 
refugees. In this way, they are forced to give the information to OPM and UNHCR. Maddox, 
Cordell, and Ittmann (2010, 23) argue that: “Censuses, surveys, and other demographic 
exercises are more often than not the work of state agencies; and the state deploys demographic 
data to administer or control its inhabitants.” They further argue that “Friedrich Nietzsche, the 
nineteenth-century philosopher who characterized knowledge itself—the great achievement of 
the modern scientific age—as “an invention that masks a will to power.”  (Maddox, Cordell, 




of governmentality which states if one is not on a biometric card one is not a refugee viable for 
aid. 
 Although the gathering of biometrics is a governmentalizing act it is also a 
cadastralizing act. Maddox, Cordell, and Ittmann (2010) writes that Van den Bersselaar (2004) 
repeats the familiar observation that colonial regimes devised schemes of data collection and 
classification ostensibly to describe their colonial possessions but also to assert their control 
(Maddox, Cordell, and Ittmann 2010, 42). The importance of cadastralization does not only 
become knowing where people are but the very gathering of information. Through gathering 
this information, OPM and UNHCR states that they are the ones with the most power. This also 
means they are the ones who govern. They also state that they are able to use the information 
they gather. Controlling what is often referred to as “the masses” require knowledge about 
them. As I argued before through Foucault (2009), the government needs wisdom, wisdom as 
the “knowledge of things, of the objectives that can and must be attained, and the “disposition 
(disposition)” one must employ in order to attain them: this is the knowledge that constitutes 
the sovereign’s wisdom.” (Foucault 2009, 100). Knowing how to gather information and how 
to use it constitutes OPM´s and UNHCR´s wisdom as well as their role. 
 As these acts are governmentalizing as well as cadastralizing they are resistant 
according to my definition of resistant acts. They are limiting the power of the refugees, but an 
act has to be responded to with another act. The refugees are therefore responding with such 
acts as using babies to manipulate the system. This partly ruins the system, since people are 
then counted twice. This is also part of a survival strategy which I will discuss later in the 
chapter. 
 Becoming homogenized can function as a survival strategy but becoming dehistoricized 
as a consequence rarely has upsides. Becoming homogenized through biometric scanning does 
not simply happen because the computers do so, dehistoricization was a problem long before 
this practice started. Malkki (1996) argue that aid itself comes with other practices that are 
dehistoricizing. When she wrote that, biometric scanning was not yet an issue. Malkki (1996) 
argue that dehistoricizing result in the refugees to lose their voice as historical actors and are 
simply viewed as victims. However, for UNHCR Dehistoricization becomes an easy price to 
pay for getting control of the refugee population. As Malkki (1996, 398) argues I agree that the 
humanitarian organisations do not do this consciously but that it is a consequence. She further 
argues that when dehistoricization is a result of the humanitarian aid, better solutions should be 
found.  




situation improving application even though he later states that it is not free from misuse. Farraj 
(2011, 941) concludes that biometric scanning is “an important tool in protecting refugees and 
asylum seekers”. Jacobsen (2015) disagrees and argues that UNHCR changes the criteria’s for 
receiving aid to biological requirement, being traceable, without thinking about the potential 
consequences. Jacobsen argues that refugees becomes a profile in a system where the biometric 
apparatus is accorded a problematic form of decision power in deciding if a person is regarded 
as deserving or not. That the biometric system leaves the subjective out of a system which 
decides if people should receive aid or not, with little attention to the potential consequences. 
Since biometrics systems make an online profile of the registered people, it does not just leave 
people open for misuse, but open for attacks by people with interest.  
 
Cadastralization’s repercussions  
When experiencing medical issues, one turns to a VHT (Village Health Team) worker. The 
VHT's are there to aid in any way possible. For someone sick, they write a reference letter that 
the person brings to the health centre. This ease the communication between patient and health 
personnel. Such letters are often helpful because of language barriers. VHT’s are also given 
phone money so they are able to call an ambulance in case of emergency, or births.  
 The VHT's work for the organisations. Although aiding sick and pregnant people within 
the village is their most important job, it is not their primary job. In a village, VHTs are 
responsibility for their own areas. They are supposed to have an overview of the number of 
people and their health status in every household in their area. This include such things as 
deaths, births, guests, sicknesses, pregnancies and more. This is then regularly reported to the 
humanitarian organisations, giving them an overview of the health situation in the villages. 
 The VHT´s has been payed less and less the last few years but has received a backpack, 
flashlight, raincoat, boots and an umbrella to make the job easier. The organisation has high 
expectations from the VHT's and give them much responsibility. At VHT meetings they are 
often told by organisations workers that "you do this to help your community". 
 The refugees in the villages are relying on and have expectations from the VHT's as 
well. They are well known in the villages as they always move around from house to house and 
talk with everyone, gathering information. People, therefore, have to show much trust to 
someone who is also their neighbour, not to share any of the information that is given. For the 
VHT's themselves such intimate knowledge about everyone can often complicate situations 





My host who was a VHT wanted me to go and buy coboyo (a small soft biscuit often 
accompanied with tea) because he does not want to buy from the neighbours because 
there the one who makes them has TB. If he is seen going any other place to buy, they 
will become annoyed at him, and he does not want that kind of drama. So, he wants me 
to go and buy it because I am a third party. I went up to the place I was the day before 
and bought for 1000 UGX. I then went by his store to give some to him and then went 
home to give some to his family.  
 
Illnesses such as TB are considered demeaning to have within the settlement, and if a VHT 
knows anyone who has it, they are not allowed to tell anyone about it. In a situation like 
described, this can cause social complications, not just for my host alone as a VHT, but for 
everyone buying coboyo from the neighbour who might get exposed. My host stands unable to 
stop his neighbour from selling coboyo as it would mean exposing them and also cut them of 
what often is a vital income source for many households within the settlement. This is one of 
the effects the organisations have on the refugees where my host has this information because 
he is a VHT.  
 The social effects this form of control has on any population is not very well 
documented. The potential consequences of being counted and controlled through numbers are 
discussed by Appadurai (1996). He calls it "enumeration of bodies" which he discusses around 
its presence in the colonial rule of India where the British government used it as a way to get 
control over the exotic. He argues that "The modern colonial state brings together the 
exoticising vision of orientalism with the familiarising discourse of statistics." (Appadurai 
1996, 133). However, they need the numbers to accomplish their goal. 
 
Thus, the unruly body of the colonial subject (fasting, feasting, hook swinging, abluting, 
burning, and bleeding) is recuperated through the language of numbers that allows these 
very bodies to be brought back, now counted and accounted, for the humdrum projects 
of taxation, sanitation, education, warfare, and loyalty (Appadurai 1996, 133) 
 
Their goal is not just to count for the sake of information, but to use it and for the humanitarian 
organisations to give aid. However, the consequences of how they get this information are 





colonial body counts create not only types and classes (the first move toward 
domesticating differences) but also homogeneous bodies (within categories) because 
number, by its nature, flattens idiosyncrasies and creates boundaries around these 
homogeneous bodies as it performatively limits their extent. (Appadurai 1996, 133) 
 
For the refugees, it means that in the process of counting people, a process that they are 
themselves participating in as explained above, they are losing their agency and making 
themselves part of the numbers, numbers without any meaning to them. Appadurai asserts that 
"As far as the native is concerned, the regime of number, as every page of such documents 
makes clear, is partly there to counteract the mendacity that is seen as constitutional to most 
natives, both farmers and measurers." (Appadurai 1996, 125). Numbers considering the 
refugees are often collected by the VHTs, who also are refugees. The numbers often become 
common knowledge for them and shape them. It becomes part of their language and shapes 
how they view each other. Appadurai states that “the fact is that the colonial gaze, and its 
associated techniques, have left an indelible mark on Indian political consciousness.” 
(Appadurai 1996, 134). Just as in India, the acts of the humanitarian organisations shape the 
refugees in ways that might be unchangeable. As the organisations attempt to change how the 
refugees think, as understood by the OPM officers quote, they might also change the refugees 
in ways they had no intentions or right to do. 
 
Stealing food 
I woke up to a rainy morning; the food distribution was on its second day, but I knew 
the food distribution today would be delayed because of the rain. I went to the village 
leader to eat breakfast with him. He told me that there were some problems with the 
food distribution because people were reporting to him that some of the refugees in the 
village were stealing food. He told me that some off the refugees that were aiding in the 
food distribution had also been aiding other refugees to steal food. He was angry that 
someone would do that, because it damaged the reputation of the refugees which he 
said he had been working hard to improve. 
 We both went over to the food distribution when the rain had stopped. The people from 
the organisations are controlling the computers, which the finger and eye scanners are 
connected to, in a tent. In front of them, on benches, approximately 30 refugees are 
sitting and waiting to be scanned and receive food. Around the food, refugees are filling 




on top of the piles of food, dragging 50 kg bags over to the others who fill the bags the 
refugees bring with them. There are people cracking cans of oil with rocks or use 
screwdrivers, then pour the oil in a large barrel where the oil is measured and given to 
the refugees. This is done on both sides of the pile of food, and refugees do all of it. 
Around the refugee workers, organisation workers are walking back and forth, 
observing them working and those receiving food. At the end of the food pile, there is a 
weight where all food is measured precisely, and food is subtracted or added to make 
the accurate weight. Both refugees and organisation workers do this work. After this, 
they have to hand in their biometric card for their household. The people doing this task 
can be a refugee or an organisation worker. This place is often crowded with people 
and bags moving back and forth. Organisation workers are also standing around in this 
area and observing what is happening. After the card is registered, the refugees may 
leave the area with their food.   
 As we arrive, the distribution was well underway. The organisations had also 
been told that some people were stealing food. I asked one of the organisation's 
supervisors how people were able to steal. He looked at me and told that there are many 
ways, the most common way is probably that when the refugees have gotten all their 
food in the bags, there are people, both refugees and organisation workers receiving 
the biometric cards so they can be scanned. He continues; by giving this to the refugee, 
he can hide it, and the refugee can say that he has had his card scanned to the 
organisations. I understand this can be done since many people are moving back and 
forth in a small area. He explains that the refugee hiding the biometric card can then 
wait until the person receiving food is outside of the area and go and give the unscanned 
card to him or her. The person is then able to either go again or give the card to someone 
else in his household who can go and get the food with some excuse. They can then do 
this again and again. He then told me that another way was that some of the refugees 
working in the food distribution could go and argue with the organisations if any cards 
were scanned twice. They could still let people through if the arguments were 
reasonable. What this argument could be, I was never told. He then also complained 
about all the food ending up on the ground. Because of stealing, 75 people did not 
receive their food this food distribution. The organisations did not understand how it 
could be such a large amount and told me that they might have received the wrong 





I did some calculations and found out that 75 people would be equal to 19 bags of maize which 
weigh 50 kg each if a person in a household of 5 people would steal food once it would equal 
63 kg of maize alone.  
  
After this incident, the humanitarian organisations were outraged, which resulted in the 
village leader becoming very angry. At the next food distribution, the village leader held 
a speech in front of all the refugees aiding the distribution where he said that if he saw 
anyone attempt any such acts this time, he would report them to the police and the 
organisations without any regrets. He said he would not let anyone damage their 
reputation and that people have multiple days without food because people are stealing.  
Things went well at that distribution. Everyone worked hard, and everyone got the food 
they were supposed to. The village leader also worked closely with everyone and 
observed the workers more closely. However, this time the vice village leader only sat 
on a chair inside the food distribution looking angry, continually being watched by 
organisation workers. People later told me that everyone knew that the vice village 
leader was the one that had been aiding people in stealing food, but no one dared to 
say anything.  
 
The form of resistance I will argue for here is not the communicative form which I argued for 
in chapter two, but what I refer to as unintentional resistance. These actions can also send 
messages and result in change, but the intent behind them is often not specific or conscious and 
as Scott (1985, 36) argue "Everyday forms of resistance make no headlines." This is one of the 
significant differences between the act portrayed in chapter two and three. Scott (1985, 28-29) 
also argue that peasants are never mentioned in history, except the times they pose as a direct 
threat to the state, which is not so often. Malkki (1996) argue that for refugees not being part 
of the history is because they have lost their voice through being dehistoricised, which happens 
through the distribution of aid that they have a right to. Because of their role based on their 
organisational form of power, the refugees most often have to stay outside of history even 
though they take part in shaping it as argued for above. 
 Stealing is quite common and is not only done to the humanitarian organisations, but 
also to the local population. They often the victims of stolen mangoes from their trees, and 
firewood from their land. At the distribution, however, it is a little different. There, stealing is 
more organised since stealing from the humanitarian organisations is no simple task. Scott 




Although it is not formal, it is a form of organising which is required to manage such a theft. I 
will argue that it happens as Scott (1985, 35) argue “they may simply follow the line of least 
resistance.” The small form of organising which does take place is a necessity to accomplish 
the act. However, what makes the resistant act possible is also its Achilles heel. Scott (1985) 
argues that "By virtue of their institutional invisibility, activities on anything less than a massive 
scale are, if they are noticed at all, rarely accorded any social significance." (Scott 1985, 35). 
The requirement of a small form of organizing puts the participators at risk of getting caught, 
which happened. The punishment was to be publicly known as a thief, and thereby losing 
respect among the refugees and humanitarian organisations. I experience this as a mild 
punishment for theft of almost a ton of food. Their arguments for the punishment was that he 
was only a suspect. Had they been caught in the act their punishment would most likely be more 
serious. Especially since it is such a serious crime. 
 Most people in the village participate in similar acts, even if it is just stealing firewood 
from the locals or making fake documents to skip a grade in school. There are multiple other 
similar acts that also could count as resistant. Many resistant acts combined can make a change. 
As Scott (1985, 35) argues, “Multiplied many thousand-folds, such petty acts of resistance by 
peasants may in the end make an utter shamble of the policies dreamed up by their would-be 
superiors in the capital.” Just as in chapter two, resistant actions do elicit responses from the 
humanitarian organisations and OPM. I do not merely argue that these are simple responses by 
a superior power but acts of resistance towards the resistant actions of the refugees like "acts 
upon acts" (Foucault 1982). The humanitarian organisations are through resisting the act of the 
refugees resisting the refugees' power. Because the humanitarian organisations respond with a 
resistant act, the refugees are required to do the same. They are in the weakened position of 
being refugees and cannot afford lose power. They, therefore, have to continue their resistant 
acts. "It is in this fashion, and not through revolts, let alone legal, political pressure, that the 
peasantry has classically made its political presence felt." (Scott 1985, 36). 
  
Kobo aridja 
After I had stayed in the village for a few months and the people had gotten used to me, 
I started hearing stories of how things were earlier in the settlement. I usually never got 
a full story, and so I often brought it up multiple times, or I went to the village leader 
whom I talked with daily to get more details. One such story started to intrigue me, the 
story of kobo aridja. I started to hear rumours about some things people did at food 




I went to the village leader and asked him what kobo aridja was. He looked at me a little 
serious and then we sat down to talk. He told me that kobo aridja is called re-cycling in 
English, which is when refugees register at many different villages to receive food in 
multiple different places. He told me that they are unable to do that anymore because 
of the biometric scanning, but that it was common, he told me that many of the people I 
had become friends with did it, even the people I lived with. I asked him if he ever did 
it, and he said a fast "no, it was wrong". He then explains to me further multiple ways 
people used to cheat the organisations.   
 He explained to me further that kobo aridja is when a refugee registers multiple 
places to receive food. By doing this, people could go to other villages or even other 
settlements to receive food which they could sell. Some of the refugees could be 
registered in many even up to 5-6 different places. He tells me people would also borrow 
people's children and babies often for money so that they were more people when 
registering and would then receive more food each time. He then tells me that some 
refugees could bribe an officer in OPM so they would receive a new refugee document. 
They could then go to the border and receive a new starter pack which all refugees 
receive. These packs contained a multitude of tarp, kitchen wares, blankets and much 
more and were worth a lot.  
 After telling me this, I start seeing a smile on his face, and he tells me that there 
is a funny story they tell about kobo aridja. Once, two men had gone together to another 
settlement to get their food. They had been sitting by the FDP talking about kobo aridja 
loudly, repeating it over and over again in their conversations. Then a white man from 
the organisations had come over and asked them what kobo aridja meant, they looked 
at each other and said that it meant “come to stay”. The white man had become so 
happy to hear this that he had given them everything even though they were not even in 
the line to receive anything. The men then went home to their village with a lot of food, 
laughing. He tells me this story while laughing loudly.  
 
As is clear from the narratives above, for the refugees, kobo aridja became a solution to improve 
their situation, a survival strategy. For many, the money and resources attained through these 
manoeuvres helped them in building new houses, helping in education or improving a business. 
After talking with the village leader about re-cycling, I spoke to a few other people about it; 
they told me that they would not do as well as they are today had they not gotten that money 




some did it because they wanted more food to eat and some did it to be able to buy more alcohol 
and drugs like khat and some getting opium.   
 Leblanc (1999) argues that the motive for an act needs to be conscious for the act to be 
deemed resistant. When intent and action are present, it makes strong cases for resistance. I 
agree with this to some extent, when intent and action both are known, it makes a strong case. 
To always see the intentions behind acts can be difficult to achieve. One can imagine that intent 
as a criteria for resistant acts might make us overlook some important, critical acts of resistance. 
Contra Leblanc, I will argue that although the criteria are not present the acts themselves can 
be deemed resistant. Scott (1989) also disagrees with Leblanc when he argues that: 
 
"much of the politics of subordinate groups falls into the category of "everyday forms 
of resistance," that these activities should most definitely be considered political, that 
they do constitute a form of collective action, and that any account which ignores them 
is often ignoring the most vital means by which lower classes manifest their political 
interests." (James C. Scott 1989, 33) 
 
As Scott (1989) argues, these small everyday forms of resistant are together a collective action, 
even if they are planed as such or not. If all refugees take part in kobo aridja, they do not do so 
as a collectively planned action, but their individual actions are part of a broader set of actions. 
When many people take part in kobo aridja, the acts get noticed by the humanitarian 
organisations, and they have to respond. However, they cannot respond to each one individually 
but has to make a collective response. 
 If the act is recognised by an observing third party and deemed resistance by them while 
at the same time not consciously intended by the performer, or recognised by the receiving 
party as intended, Hollander and Einwhoner (2004) call it externally defined resistance. When 
neither the intention of the actor nor the recognition by the target is there, it is hard to argue that 
it is a form of resistance that wants to change something. Hollander and Einwhoner argue that 
"to identify as resistance an act that is neither intended as resistance nor seen as such by those 
whom the act may oppose requires a heavy burden of proof.” (Hollander and Einwhoner 2004, 
545). To do this, the very act needs to be observed precisely and detailed. Since the act itself 
can be observed by the intended target but not recognised as an act of resistance, their account 
of the action can also be used by the third party. Since someone committed the act, the account 
can also be collected by them, seeing they are willing to tell. Obtaining all three parties account 




Scott (1985) argues: the individual act does not stand alone and has to be seen in a larger picture 
where the acts take form as a collective action. When pursuing Scott's argument that the 
"everyday forms of resistance" is perhaps the most essential form of resistance as political acts, 
the arguments for the importance of conscious intent and other parties' recognition of the act 
becomes to some extent irrelevant for deeming the act resistant or not. As with the collective 
action of kobo aridja was stopped in the end and was understood as a resistant act which made 
the system the humanitarian organisations had inserted powerless. If the intent was to steal food 
to survive or to resist becomes irrelevant as the actions made the humanitarian organisations 
change their systems. 
 This further brings another issue with acts such as kobo aridja as resistant acts, the 
argument that there is simply no resistance in them, that they are purely acts of individual gain. 
Scott (1985) argues that "To insist on such distinctions as a means of comparing forms of 
resistance and their consequences is one thing, but to use them as the basic criteria to determine 
what constitutes resistance is to miss the very wellsprings of peasant politics.” (Scott 1985, 
295). To argue that the intent was not to resist but for the individual gain misses the point of 
the act as the act can be both, which is much the point of the act. That can also be seen in acts 
such as riots portrayed in chapter two and act portrayed by Bertelsen (2016) where riots 
followed the rise in prices of everyday commodities and public transport in Mozambique. Scott 
(1985, 295) argues that in any rebellion by the subordinate powers, the basic need of any 
household is what is at the centre. To get what they need to survive and to improve their lives 
is what is at the core. By stealing and tricking in the manner of kobo aridja, the refugees are not 
only resisting the higher classes or the people in control, they are using their power for 
individual gain and states that this is what they need. Scott (1985) argues that "The intrinsic 
nature and, in one sense, the "beauty" of much peasant resistance is that it often confers 
immediate and concrete advantages, while at the same time denying resources to the 
appropriating classes, and that it requires little or no manifest organisation." (Scott 1985, 296). 
If the refugees are motivated by individual gain, that gain can also mean that the organisations 
are not giving them enough. A person who has all the food he or she wants would not steal, and 
so the act itself becomes the act of resistance, saying that “I/we want more”. When enough 
people commit such acts, they might give results. Kobo aridja becomes just such an act of 
resistance.  
 Kobo aridja had severe consequences for OPM and the humanitarian organisations, 
including UNHCR. Kobo aridja resulted in so many people being counted multiple times that 




of refugees in the Bidi Bidi settlement stood at almost 300 000 people. This was incorrect and 
multiple aid workers told me that they knew that the number was wrong. When the number of 
refugees in Uganda is higher than it is in truth, then it means Uganda is also receiving more 
money than they are supposed to. This started a struggle between OPM and the international 
donors, also including multiple corruption cases. As part of the problem of miscounting, 
UNHCR conducted biometric scanning on all refugees in Uganda to get the number of refugees 
correct which stopped people from kobo aridja9.  
 
Conclusion 
The humanitarian organisations and OPM´s use of governmentality to govern the settlement 
unfolds through different institutions. For instance through schools, distributions and courses 
the refugees are thought how to behave and how to expect other refugees to behave. Most of 
these institutions are not set up by the humanitarian organisations and OPM with such an 
objective in mind (exceptions being courses specifically oriented towards behaviour) but it is 
still has, as I have shown, a consequence. These disciplinary mechanisms shape the refugees.  
However, in addition to making the refugees govern themselves, the humanitarian 
organisations and OPM also state that they are the ones in charge, the ones who govern. This 
happens through them being the ones in control of the knowledge in the settlement. This is 
sometimes challenged by such institutions as the churches or the use of local medicine instead 
of going to the health centres.  
 Another dimension I have demonstrated above, is that the humanitarian organisations 
and OPM explicitly make use of cadastralization to make aid distribution more effective. While 
I have presented multiple ways in which refugees are cadastralized.  The consequences are most 
likely unknown to the refugees, humanitarian organisations and OPM. The two latter views this 
as a good way to govern the former. As the party with both the structural power and the most 
power, the humanitarian organisations have the authority to gather information. But I also argue 
that through cadastralizing the refugees they are also stating their role as the governing party 
by being the ones who gather harness and deploy knowledge to further govern the refugees.  
 The refugees, however, act resistant towards the humanitarian organisations and OPM 
as they are the superior power. I argue that their power is upheld through such actions as being 
the controlling organ of the governmental institutions and the ones who are in control of the 
 
9http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2018/11/28/audit-finds-un-refugee-agency-





cadastralizing acts. As I have argued, such acts committed by the humanitarian organisations 
and OPM are resistant acts which must be responded to by a counter act. My main argument in 
this chapter is, therefore, that the refugees, when acting resistant, are responding to the effects 
of cadastralization and control. This happens through stealing and tricking or cheating the very 
control systems set up, effectively resisting the other parties’ power. Such acts of resistance 
become an essential characteristic of the relationship between the humanitarian organisations, 


















































Resistance, violence and hospitality 
 





As I have shown also in preceding chapters, the three parties within the settlement are engaged 
in a constant struggle wherein they are oriented towards achieving opposing goals. Further, this 
struggle unfolds in a multitude of ways, with the exertion of different types of power and 
through acts of resistance. To get a fuller picture of the situation in the settlement, I will here 
focus on the host community as their forms of power within this matrix is complicated and but 
heavily affects the other parties' actions. Specifically, I will, therefore, discuss how the hosts' 
role and power affect their relations with both the refugees and the humanitarian organisations 
within the overall context of the settlement. I will further discuss how a host can be both 
hospitable and resistant towards a guest and how the simultaneity of such dimensions affects 
the relationship between the parties.  
 To let people into your home and take care of them has a long human history and is 
known in anthropology through the term hospitality and is often conceptualized as occurring 
within a private sphere between a few individuals. In anthropology hospitality is often regarded 
as central to many different aspects of human sociality and Paolo Gaibazzi (2018, 472) goes so 
far as to argue that “Comparatively speaking, hospitality is often crucial for defining the very 
boundaries of humanity.” In several of such studies, through hospitality the host is responsible 
for taking care of the guest and can decide what is going to happen while s/he is there. Typically, 
there is a host and a guest, however in Bidi Bidi, there are two parties that act as host, but in 
very different ways:  The local community and the humanitarian organisations10. When it comes 
to the refugee discourse, hospitality has a different understanding, I will, therefore, further 
discuss this aspect through  King (1995), Pitt-Rivers (2012) and Rozakou (2012). 
 The roles the two host parties take upon themselves are not always cooperative, and 
their interests are often not mutually supportive or overlapping. The local community, 
commonly referred to in the development discourse also as the host community, are the ones 
who own the land the refugees live on and allow them to stay. However, they are unable to take 
care of the refugees, which is where the humanitarian organisations take over; they are there to 
take care of the refugees, the guests.  
As the treatment of the refugees by the humanitarian organisations has been discussed 
throughout the thesis, this chapter will go deeper into the host community's and their relation 
to the other parties. The host communities include all people part of the communities that give 
away land for the refugees to live on and are the ones who get jobs, money, food and other 
 
10 OPM will not be a part of either of the parties deemed host; this is because they are not in charge of the services 




opportunities as a direct effect of presence of refugees and humanitarian organisations, mainly 
from the 30 per cent the humanitarian organisations give as part of the 70/30 rule. 
 For analytical purposes, in preceding parts of the thesis I have not focused specifically 
on the host community and I will therefore start here by elaborating on how the they are affected 
by the arrival of the refugees. I will then discuss what may be seen to comprise hospitality 
within the settlement and I will analyse what I see as a triangle of reciprocity. I will then go on 
to discuss how the host community undertake resistant acts towards the refugees, but that their 
act is a communicational form of resistance where the refugees are not the ones the 
communication is intended for. I then go on to show how violence and resistance towards the 
refugees has changed from the 1990s to today. I will also discuss the 70/30 rule further in this 
chapter through an example of how the host community can interpret this rule. Lastly, I will 
present a complex incident between the refugees and the host community to demonstrate how 
mutual tricking and cheating may occur. 
 
Host community empowerment 
Because land in North-west Uganda is mostly owned by communities which means OPM has 
few land rights in the area. When the refugees arrived in 2016, OPM had to ask the local 
communities in the area if they were willing to give the refugees land to live on. Some 
communities said no, while others accepted. For those who said yes, their land became 
developed with roads, water points and infrastructure such as police stations, health centres and 
schools. The humanitarian organisations brought education and a health system that is also 
beneficial for the host party. Both OPM and the humanitarian organisations say that many of 
these schools and health centres will keep running with trained local personnel after the 
refugees have returned home. Many of the host communities also receive access to the water 
system, water continuously being the most wanted resource. Complicating matters, the host 
community also complain that after the refugees arrived, they have destroyed their river (which 
is their natural water source) because they throw trash and urinate close to the river, making the 
water undrinkable, even for the animals.   
 For the case of water, the host community are often referring to the 70/30 rule. This rule 
is often discussed since how it is meant to be used in practice is never stated, which creates 
issues for the humanitarian organisations when talking about it with the host community. Food 
is another aspect and one I will return to later. It says specifically in the ReHoPE document that 
food is not to be part of the 70/30 rule (The World Bank 2017). However, it is widely accepted 




refugee, although it is not talked about. Although the issue of the 70/30 rule is with the 
humanitarian organisations the host community are often seen committing violence and 
resistance towards the refugees.  
 For the host community the 70/30 rule is their empowerment, the knowledge of it is 
what makes them able to set demands from the humanitarian organisations. Demands they 
would not be able to set with the Ugandan government or anyone else. This gives the host 
community a form of organisational power in relation to the humanitarian organisations, similar 
to the refugees. Being able to demand, further empowers them through better schools, local 
health centres and access to job training which they can also participate in. How the 70/30 rule 
affect the relation between the parties will be further discussed in this chapter. 
 
Hospitality in the settlement 
Then, what is hospitality? Carol A. King (1995) discusses this and argue that hospitality has 
four main characters. The first is that it is a relationship between individuals who act as host 
and guest. Second, she says that social hospitality has a social obligation where the guest has 
to reciprocate being a guest and contribute to the relationship. Third, King writes that there 
should be a great pleasure for the guest and that security for the guest and the guest's property 
should be of concern. Fourth is that the process of hospitality includes the arrival and making 
the guest feel welcome. However, these aspects are simplifying the situation of hospitality. 
Here, she presents the guest as someone who is always to be taken care of and protected. 
Shifting the approach somewhat and drawing on research in Oceania, Pitt- Rivers (2012, 504) 
present the guest as something unknown; someone who can be anything and who’s word cannot 
be checked. He further argues that even if a person is respected in their community, they cannot 
expect that same respected when being a guest in another. Pitt-Rivers’ and King’s approaches 
resonate somewhat with my material; 
 
After a struggle between the host community and the refugees, they had a meeting in the 
largest church in the refugee village. There an elder from the host community said that 
he though the refugees did not respect him or his family and that the refugees did not 
adapt to people in Uganda. All the refugees were quiet, then a preacher from the 
refugees stood up and apologised for their behaviour and told all the other refugees 
that they should all follow the phrase; "when in Rome, do as the Romans", that they 




By doing this, they were able to be more accepted by their host. Pitt-Rivers argues that "The 
law of hospitality is founded upon ambivalence. It imposes order through an appeal to the 
sacred, makes the unknown knowable, and replaces conflict by reciprocal honour. It does not 
eliminate the conflict altogether but places it in abeyance and prohibits its expression." (Pitt-
Rivers 2012, 513). It is the act of becoming host and guest, as long as the characteristics of 
hospitality which King (1995) present are followed. When these are broken, it can be 
experienced as a resistant act which is often responded with resistance. Such acts will be 
presented later. 
 The roles of the host and guests need to be maintained to maintain the relation. Rozakou 
(2012) writes about hospitality among refugees in Greece where being host and being 
hospitable is an empowerment. Aid workers visit the refugees in Greece so they can be made 
the host, to empower them. Rozakou argues that they then have the choice to be hospitable or 
not, but within having that option, there is a form of personal power. When discussing this in 
the context of African refugees and Bidi Bidi refugee settlement specifically, the understanding 
of hospitality has to change. As Rozakou discuss, there is empowerment in being the host and 
that power is given by the guest. 
 This is one of the issues in the Bidi Bidi settlement, that the roles are not always 
understood in this way, much cause the role are not distinct enough for everyone to know 
exactly the role they are dealing with. The humanitarian organisations take part in the social 
role of the host as they are the party that can take care of the refugees, the guest. As the refugees 
do not have a lot to give in return for the host communities hospitality, it is the humanitarian 
organisations and OPM who take on this role. They are the ones that can give the host 
community jobs, roads, improved education, a better health system, food, money and water for 
their hospitality for the refugees. the humanitarian organisation takes on the role as the party 
which must maintain the other roles as "Host and guest must pay each other honour." (Pitt-
Rivers 2012, 513). King's third point is mixed between the different parties. It is the host 
community who has made it possible for the humanitarian organisations to threat the refugees 
the way they are. However, there are also multiple acts from the host communities which 
directly affect the pleasure of the refugees stay, such as giving extra land, letting them get food 
and other resources from their land and maintaining an economy between the two groups. As 
there is a relationship between the host, the guest there is also power. The host is the one with 
the power to choose to be hospitable, to treat the guest kindly, choose what to give and what 
not to, but within the refugee discourse, the power relation is a little different. Pitt-Rivers (2012, 




With this, he means that to have rights and responsibilities removes the host, its need to exist 
since the "guest" is in a situation where he or she is able to take care of themselves. Although 
the refugees do have rights within the settlement, these rights are based on the specific hosts' 
presence. If the host community had not been present, then the refugees would have no rights 
to receive land, and if the humanitarian organisations had not been there, the refugees would 
have no one to claim their right of aid from. Because of the lop-sidedness of power within the 
settlement, the refugees still hold the role as guests. 
 Within the settlement, two parties act as hosts, the local community and the 
humanitarian organisations. These parties do not always work together or have mutual interests. 
As the local community are the owners of the land, they are the ones who hold power over it. 
They have the structural power, as is explained by Wolf (1990) to decide what happens and 
how power is distributed on it. When the refugees come, the local community is not able to host 
them, but the humanitarian organisations are. The humanitarian organisations therefor go to the 
local community to get permission to use their land to treat the refugees. If the local community 
accept this, they will have little power over the land, but in return, they expect 30 per cent of 
all aid given in the area. 
 Because as Pitt-Rivers (2012, 514) argue "A host is host only on the territory over which 
on a particular occasion he c1aims authority." The host community authorise the humanitarian 
organisation and OPM to use theirs in change for 30 per cent of the aid given by the 
humanitarian organisations. By doing this, the host community also give away parts of their 
role as host. The 30 per cent are there as reciprocity for the hosts' kindness, King's second point, 
as the refugees are unable to reciprocate this themselves. The host community, however, are 
still the proper owners of the land, and they expect the refugees to behave while living on their 
land.  
 As the different parties have their rights, their power and who are all connected in a 
triangle of reciprocity, they all expect the other parties to act accordingly. Aid becomes an act 
of hospitality to the refugees. Since it is also given to the host community, it becomes a 
reciprocal act to them as well, from the humanitarian organisations. Since the host community 
know what they are receiving for hosting the refugees, they have few incentives to do anything 
extra for the refugees, and there are no expectations that the roles will ever change. Because of 
this, the expectations of reciprocity are much more urgent, and there is little hospitality towards 






A triangle of reciprocity 
Circular reciprocity was made famous by Marcel Mauss (Mauss 1990) in his book The Gift in 
which he discussed, among other things, the Kula ring of the coast of Papua New Guinea. There, 
bracelets and necklaces were handed to chiefs on different islands which circulated physically 
in adverse directions. This way, an exchange was made every time a neckless or bracelet was 
given to a chief. In the same book, Mauss argues for the hau of the gift, which is a form of 
power between the giver and receiver of a gift to make sure it was reciprocated. Hau, among 
the Maori, is a spirit within the gift that belongs to the donor of it and which must be returned, 
or harm may befall the receiver (Mauss 1990, 11). 
 Within the refugee settlement, the act of giving something does not conform to such a 
model of following the hau of the gift. For, when the host population gives something to the 
refugees, they expect the humanitarian organisations to reciprocate such a gift. The receiver 
and the reciprocator become two different parties. There is an understanding that the refugees 
are not in a position where they can reciprocate what they are given. Because of the relation 
between the parties, the hau in the gift disappears since the receiver keeps the gift without 
giving anything back. I will here argue that because off this change, the 70/30 policy is needed 
to formalise the reciprocity within the settlement to make sure acts are adequately reciprocated.   
 Within the settlement, the host community giving the basic land to all the refugees and 
later the additional farmland, is an act which requires some form of reciprocation. The 
reciprocation of these acts is supposed to happen through the 30 per cent, but what the 30 per 
cent really means are discussed continuously. Such acts never include just two parties of the 
triangle, but all three are always affected. The parties are always interconnected, and each party 
are nothing without the others, the power is given and taken by the other parts. This is part of 
the mutual dependency of the three parties within the context of the settlement. The 
humanitarian organisations become dependent on the refugees approving their aid and do not 
throw them out of the settlement as made an example of in chapter two. This is because as a 
UNHCR worker said: "We are UNHCR, we cannot fail". The host, however, receives nothing 
from the organisations if the refugees are not there. The refugees do not have land to live on 
and receive no aid if the other parties are not there.  
 While the host population is clearly not an aid organisation, they do have large amounts 
of land on their hands. Thus, when they give land, it may not be considered aid in a strict sense 
because they do so, based on the assumption that it will be reciprocated with the 30 per cent. 
From the refugees they expect to be able to trade, they expect them to maintain their land and 




population, because they know that the refugees also bring much trouble with them. They might 
steal food and animals, be violent, introduce new types of drugs and they can ruin water sources 
such as rivers and water holes. Because of this and other perceived problems, the host 
population needs more—but the refugees have little to give.   
 To be able to give aid to the refugees (and control them), the organisations need them 
to be in a specific place and this land has to be given by the host population. That makes the 
gift of land not just a gift to the refugees, but a gift to the humanitarian organisations and OPM 
as well. This means that the land has to be reciprocated by them as well as the refugees. This is 
where the 70/30 kicks in, and the 30 per cent of all aid should go to the host population as a 
policy of reciprocity. Through this, the humanitarian organisations give the host population 
improved education, local healthcare, valuable trees, a road network and access to a water 
system with clean water. The host population are also often reminded that they get all this 
infrastructure, education and health care after the refugees have left as well. This is why OPM 
is always strongly arguing that the organisations should make permanent buildings and not 
make temporary health centres or schools.  
 These actions do have their exceptions, though. Some actions are done by individuals 
who are based on reciprocity based in hospitality. Such an example can be seen when some 
people from the host population give more land than they need to, or which is asked of them. 
One such example is depicted in the introduction. This is done because many from the host 
population has been refugees in South Sudan and were given land by the local population there. 
Now they wish to return the favour. Even though such friendly acts do happen, they are not 
common. The regular thing is still to give something and expect something in return. There is 
little hospitality towards the refugees without reciprocity, and without reciprocity, resistance 





Photo 8: one of the largest rivers which many locals use as drinking water. This river is 
often crossed by cars and trucks, but not all can make it across. Photo: Mikko Virtanen 
 
Resistance with a motive 
The OPM also says that violence has changed and that the motives are no longer the same. In 
an interview with an OPM officer, I was told that in 2016-2017 the host community were often 
attacking the refugees. The officer told me that they quickly went to the communities that were 
doing these acts, and when they arrived, the communities had other matters to discuss. OPM 
and the humanitarian organisations then started to understand that they were paying too little 
attention to the host communities. The host communities had started to attack the refugees 
because they knew the organisations would come and talk with them if they did. The officer 
told me with a surprised and serious look that a host community leader had told him that he had 
a group of young men ready to go out and do bad things to the refugees. The community leader 
so the OPM and humanitarian organisations would come and talk. 
 These acts are not intended as resistance towards the refugees. However, the refugees 




humanitarian organisation which was precisely what the host community wanted. The resistant 
act becomes an act of communication to the "host" party and not to the recipients of the acts. 
When OPM and humanitarian organisations understood this, they started to pay more attention 
to the host community. When they did, the acts of violence from the host community quickly 
stopped, the officer told me.   
 OPM and the humanitarian organisations are responsible for reciprocating the host 
community for what they have given to the refugees. That reciprocation happens over a longer 
time and requires constant communication to happen. When the host community acts with such 
a goal in mind, they feel that there is a lack of reciprocation and communication about it. The 
refugees become caught between the humanitarian organisations and the host community as a 
communication tool. As Scott (1985, 35) argues, since the objective of the resisters is typically 
to meet such pressing needs as physical safety, road, land, or income, and to do so in relative 
safety, they may simply follow the line of least resistance. The refugees are precisely such a 
line to accomplish what they want.   
 
Violence in the past 
Most of the refugees present in Bidi Bidi today have been refugees in conflict before, and many 
have been refugees in Uganda before. Most of them struggle with talking about their past 
experiences, and these experiences can be quite brutal. In the middle of the 1990s, there was a 
war in Sudan between what is today Sudan and South Sudan. Many people had to flee to other 
countries, and many have lived in other countries since. Those who fled to Uganda were met 
with another war, where some have both physical and psychological scars. As my friend Martin 
and I talked for some time in a small hut just him and me, I asked if he would tell me about that 
time:     
 
He tells me that the local people used to play a game with them. There were large groups 
of men who would grab refugees; they started to ask them a series of questions. They 
started by saying that they did not want the refugees there and then they asked if they 
were going to leave, if the refugee said no, they would cut off the persons ears because 
they do not listen. They would then ask if the person wanted to smile, if answered yes 
they would put a knife in their mouth and cut their cheeks up so they could always smile 
and if they answered no they would cut holes in the upper and lower lip and put a lock 




and he ended with saying that they asked a lot more questions and did many more things, 
but he did not want to share.  
  
Luckily, this never happened to him, but these horrible stories were not uncommon. They are 
also being referred to when pointing out how bad the relationship between the refugees and the 
host community can be. For many such stories are a portrayal off the hardship, they have 
endured in the past. When I discussed this with the village leader, he tells me that the anger of 
the host community in the 1990s was understandable, "they were poor, and they did not receive 
what we did". 
 As the refugees from South Sudan escaped the war in Sudan in the 1990s, they arrived 
in Uganda to another war where they were met by rebel armies, government and humanitarian 
organisations. This is often referred to as the Northern Ugandan war or the Kony wars and 
started in 1987 and lasted until 2006 (Finnström 2008b). Kony and his lord’s resistance army 
(LRA) started in 1987 after he took over the role as leader when his cousin Alice Lakwena lost 
a battle (Behrend 1999). LRA became widely known to be using child soldiers, branding and 
hurting people to a devastating extent. Because the Ugandan government did not want to supply 
the enemy, they put large parts of the Acholi population into camps where they lacked most 
basic resources (Finnstrøm 2009). As LRA started to work together and found support with the 
Sudanese government at the time (Behrend 2000), their motivation to attack South Sudanese 
refugees likely increased. 
 
Violence today 
Today, not everyone is friendly towards the refugees. The village leader told me of a refugee 
man from village 11 who got attacked on his way back from S.S on his bike.  
 
He had been taking a rest just outside our village when four men from the local 
community attacked him. It happened close to one of the houses in the village, and the 
man who lived there had noticed the fight; he had then phoned another man for help. 
They had grabbed some sticks and ran to help; they managed to stop the fight. The 
injured refugee had lost all his things, including the bike. He had then been brought to 
our village leader. The four men had taken everything with them and gone to their 
village leader. The refugee on the bike had then been given a place to sleep for the night, 
and his injuries had been taken care of. My village leader had then gone to the host 




they should not be moving outside so late. My village leader had then said that it was 
only nine o'clock and that the four men were also moving outside so late. He then 
continued by saying that if people were not allowed to move outside so late, does that 
give other people the right to rob that man and beat him? The host leader had then 
apologised about what had happened, and my village leader had been told that the four 
men were the vice-chairman, youth secretary, general secretary and the son of the host 
community leaders' son. The case never went to the police as it was handled between 
the parties. My village leader told me that had they not apologised and regretted their 
actions he would have included the police. The next day they went to get the man's 
belongings, everything was still there, and the man continued to cycle to his village. 
  
Violence does occur between the host community and the refugees. Situations similar to the 
one pictured above are common and often kept between the refugee and the host community 
without the police and the humanitarian organisations ever knowing anything. Other acts, more 
severe acts also occur between the parties where women are raped and sometimes even cut with 
machetes; these incidences are more rare but do occur. Such acts are not excused in any way 
by the host community and often reported to the police, and individuals are arrested. The village 
leader told me that those acts do not represent the host community, and many of the different 
leaders have a common understanding that such acts are done by individuals and represent only 
individuals. When four men who represent the host, community do such acts as described 
above, it is different, which is also why the host community apologised for the act in the end. 
 The change in violence from the 1990s and today is notable. The time in history did 
matter and had the north Ugandan war not taken place when the refugees arrived; things would 
most likely be different. The changes in time and the changes in laws, policies and rules are 
what has changed the forms of resistance. The host community still resist the refugees today, 
and many communities still do not want them on their land, but the forms of resistance have 
changed. The violence is still present, but the messages are different. The host community does 
not want the refugees to leave as they did in the 1990s, but today the resistance is more of a 
frustration in the situation which can often result in the parties trying to cheat or trick each 











Picture 9: The difference in the amount of water in the river can cause problems, and for 




A host man wanted to build a house for him and his family. To make the bricks he needs 
for the house, he needs water. The river is dry and the water station that was supposed 
to come near his house months ago has still not been put up by the humanitarian 
organisations. The man then remembers the 30 per cent he is entitled to as a host. He 
then takes two 30-litre cans on his bicycle and cycles to the nearest refugee village. He 
sees a water station which has three taps. While other refugees are filling up their water 
cans, he steps into the line. He then takes one of the taps and fills up his water cans; the 
refugees are complaining since they all know that this water is meant for them and that 




takes the cans filled with water and cycles home to make his bricks. This quickly gets 
reported to the organisation which goes to the man's house and warns him that he 
cannot do that. The man apologises for what he did, and the organisation workers leave. 
About a week later the man comes back to the water station, he needs more water but 
since he does not want more complains he goes out into the bush where the water pipes 
are, and he makes a hole in the pipe and connects his tap on to the pipe. He then 
continues to use the water to make the rest of the bricks. The man quickly gets caught 
by the organisation workers since the pipes are measured at specific points. This time 
the man was arrested and went to jail. The man complained and said that he had never 
taken any more than the 30 per cent, which was his right. Even the first time he had only 
taken water from one of the three taps. 
  
The understanding of what the 30 per cent really is, is difficult for the different parties to 
understand. For some of the host, it is seen as 30 per cent of anything that is given to the 
refugees, including what they can take at will. For the organisations the 30 per cent is everything 
the host are receiving for hosting the refugees. This also means that the 30 per cent are 
impossible to measure. How long buildings and roads will last, how education, health services 
and jobs will last and how much it can help all refugees is difficult to measure. For many of the 
host, a water station for their cows to drink is more important than maintaining the roads. For 
someone who has been sick for a long time, a health centre close to their home can change and 
even save their life. For many of the organisations the 30 per cent are also seen as money that 
is already scarce, that could have gone to help many of the refugees a lot more. The refugees 
do not look at the 30 per cent as something that should have gone to them, it is seen as an 
argument between the host community and the humanitarian organisations which they, the 
refugees often pay the price for. 
 
Goats and bicycles 
Isaac buys a goat;he tells his family, and asks them to take care of it. His children take 
it to the bush and tie it there. Only three days after he bought the goat, it runs away. 
Isaac goes to tell the chairman that he should announce to people that there is a missing 
goat of so and so colour. What he does not know is that the goat is found by Naamah, 





 Meanwhile, a refugee called Michael has borrowed a bicycle to another refugee 
called Benjamin. Benjamin borrows this bicycle for so long that it almost becomes his. 
When a friend of Benjamin from the host community called Judas comes and ask to 
borrow the bike, he is told that he can. Judas then takes the bike to town but does not 
return with it. Benjamin then asks why, but Judas is hesitant and says the bike is broken. 
Benjamin says that they should go and get the bike, he can even pay for transport. Judas 
does not want to do that, and later Benjamin has no option but to go to the chairman of 
his village to ask for help and to create a dialogue with the host community as required 
in such cases. The chairman does this, but the host community says that Judas is a thief 
and if they get him, they should arrest him. They manage to get him and takes him to 
the community help desk to report him. Judas says the bike is in Yumbe and that he can 
get it in three days. Now the chairman asks what he can be given as security for him 
coming back with the bike. Judas, who is a national and part of the host community, 
Judas then says that the chairman can take his ration card. He goes to get the card, but 
it turns out that his picture is not in the card and so the only people who would be 
punished are his family and not him. The chairman does not accept this and takes him 
to the police. A few days later, the chairman sees the man walking free. He calls the 
police and asks why that is. The police say that they do not have any cell to hold the 
person in. The chairman complains, saying that they should have told him because now 
Benjamin might think that the police, Judas and the chairman has made a deal. He also 
asks who will be responsible now if there is any violence conducted because Judas is 
walking free. After Judas is released, he turns to the bush to hide, leaving home very 
early in the morning and returning very late at night. The bike is now lost, and no one 
knows where it is and to make things worse, Michael, the original owner of the bike 
wants the bicycle back.   
 Another place there is a man called Abraham, who has an ok, old bike. He wants 
to sell the bike to buy some goats. Benjamin, who borrowed the bike to Judas now has 
to get a new bike to give to Michael. Benjamin goes to Abraham and says he wants to 
buy the bike, but the seller wants two goats for it. He then goes to Martha, the wife of 
Judas and asks if they can compensate him for the loss of the bike in any way. She says 
she can be able to get one goat and some money as compensation. She then goes to buy 
a goat from Noah, whose wife found the goat in the bush. Martha then takes the goat to 
Benjamin, who needs a new bicycle to give to Michael. While Benjamin has the goat at 




has seen his goat. They then go to talk to Benjamin who tells them he intended to give 
the goat with some money to Abraham with the bicycle so he could give back a bicycle 
to Michael. They ask Benjamin where he got it, and he tells them the truth. They then 
go back to Martha and asks her where she got the goat. She tells them and then she has 
to go to Noah and says that they either have to give her another goat, or the money 
back. They choose to give another goat. Martha then gives the goat to Benjamin, who 
needs a goat so he can get the bicycle from Abraham. Benjamin manages to do so and 
gets the bicycle and gives it to Michael. Meanwhile, Noah and Naamah from the host 
community who took the goat from the bush are walking free, including Judas who lost 
the bicycle. The bicycle is most likely sold, and Judas is keeping the money.   
 
Theft and trickery between the refugees and the host community is a common thing. The 
refugees are often seen as opportunities by the host community, as it is easier to trick them, and 
it has fewer consequences. In this situation with the goats and bicycles, Judas was a known 
criminal in the host community, that is why the police were included. As with the man on the 
bicycle, cycling from South Sudan and who got attacked, incidences, even violent ones often 
go unnoticed by all other parties, but the parties included in the incident. The incapability's of 
the police are also very well known by everyone. This makes it easier for people to do criminal 
acts as they know that there most likely will not be any consequences for their actions. 
 It is important to note that incidences, as described, are only possible because of the 
tight relationship between the refugees and the host community. For example: People from 
different groups are friends and often rely on each other's services. They have a shared economy 
which builds on this relation and requires that a good relation between the parties is maintained.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite resistant acts between the parties, the refugees are still welcomed in the settlement. As 
the refugees have lived there for three years, the parties have started to rely on each other both 
socially and economically. The host community knows that the refugees are unable to 
reciprocate everything they have given, and teherfore the host community expect the 
humanitarian organisations to do so. They then claim their right to receive 30 per cent of the 
aid from the humanitarian organisations, which is how the triangle of reciprocity works. 
 In the past, the refugees have been treated in horrible ways by the local population in 
Uganda, but today things have changed. The resistant acts committed are less violent and does 




situation, and for the host community, their acts go towards the line of least resistance to get 
what they most need, which Scott (1985) argue that the peasants did in India. 
 The power in the guest-host relation has changed in the settlement, much cause of the 
presence of the humanitarian organisations. Because of their presence, power shifts between 
the parties and can make the roles as host and guest obscure. My main argument is however 
that resistant acts and hospitality can be in the same relations and one does not have to oppose 

















































conceptualising the relations 
 
Throughout the thesis, I have argued for an unconventional understanding of resistance being 
necessary to analytically unentangle the dynamics at work in the Bidi Bidi settlement 
contributing, as it does, to moving away from the typical oppressor and oppressed view on a 
relation. That is, even though the parties do have different forms and amount of power.  
As Foucault (1978, 95) writes "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or 
rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" 
And as there is a power relation between the parties, the resistance has to be there, in relation 
to the power. I have argued that what is resisted is power, and that since that power belongs to 
someone, one also resists the party. By viewing resistance and power in this way, one can view 
resistance as something more dynamic and that is situation dependent. As even the relations 
can be understood as dynamic, some aspects of them also become clearer. By understanding 
the relations in the settlement one can be able to understand the social need to improve the 
implementation of aid or the general treatment of the situation. Without such understanding, 
change can be difficult to accomplish.  
 Refugees around the world often stand powerless against the government in the nation-
state they are staying in (Choudhury 2020, Peteet 2005, Tsitselikis 2019). However, as 
discussed in chapter one, refugees in Uganda are further empowered. This means that the 
refugees in Uganda can act in a way, refugees in other nations cannot. They are allowed to 
move where they want, live where they want, get work where they want and even get their own 
land to live on and farm, if they please. These empowerments change the role of the refugee. 
Although they are still refugees, they step out of their role since as Malkki (1995b) argues, 
refugees are expected the be helpless by the international community. An empowered refugee, 
therefore, becomes a contradiction in terms and humanitarian organisations policies and rules 
are typically made to fit an aid discourse surrounding a helpless refugee. Their work will, 
therefore, always have to adapt to the refugee's empowerment and how the refugees use their 
empowerment is quite unpredictable. This makes the relation between the two parties a 
complicated one. Although the humanitarian organisations and OPM are the governing party 





 The humanitarian organisations and the OPM, I argue, therefore use governmentality 
and cadastralization, which maintains their control of the settlement. These methods challenge 
and oppose the refugees’ empowerment, and I, therefore, deem them resistant towards the 
refugees. Based on cadastralization and governmentality, these measures limit the refugees’ 
chances of acting resistant towards the humanitarian organisations and the OPM and at the same 
time, state their role as the governing party  
 Through cadastralization, I argue, the humanitarian organisations and the OPM are 
exerting their power as the party that gathers and keeps control of knowledge in the settlement. 
However, this is not the primary purpose of the process: As argued by Scott (1998), 
cadastralization is used, simply, to emplace people to specific areas on maps and to standardise 
societies to ease the gathering of taxes and increase production.  
Based on my analyses above, I concur with Scott, (i.e. that it is used to improve the 
distribution of aid in the settlement) but that, additionally, it served to state their role as the 
governing party. Such forms of governing can, as Appadurai (1996) argue, shape the people in 
ways it can be difficult to change later. Cadastralization in the settlement happens in multiple 
forms, as biometrics which puts each person into a complete record of all refugees. In addition 
to this VHT´s manually count each refugee in the settlement. By being the party that stands for 
the gathering of this information, the party that can use it and keeps control of it the 
humanitarian organisations state that they are the governing party. 
 In addition to cadastralization, I argue that the humanitarian organisations and OPM use 
governmentality. As Foucault (2009) argue, governmentality is a good thing when governing 
people as it makes people govern themselves through the rules and laws set by the state. I argue 
this happens through Schools, health centres, courses, job training and distributions as what 
Foucault (2009) calls disciplinary mechanisms. In the settlement, however, the people are not 
the regular people of a state, but refugees from a different state, becoming subjects to another. 
I, therefore, argue that governmentality pulls the refugees into something that they did not sign 
up for, which I, for instance, showed an example of with the refugees not being thought South 
Sudanese history, but Ugandan. The good thing about governmentality, however, is that it 
empowers the refugees through the same disciplinary mechanisms. I argue that it by shaping 
them into governing themselves they also become able to shape the governing party through 
what Nielsen (2011) calls inverse governmentality. I deem acts of inverse governmentality 
resistant as it challenges the power of the governing party.  
 Although both these forms are implemented in the settlement, the refugees and the host 




other roles, the situations and their power. As these situations changed, the refugees adapted 
and found new ways to act resistant in different scenarios depicted in both chapter two and 
three. As the situation changes, the resistance changes.  
I have in this thesis differentiated between two different forms of resistance, first the 
form which I deem communicative resistant acts. Second, forms of resistance often more 
similar what Scott (1985) calls everyday forms of resistance, which I here call unintentional 
resistance because of the lack of specific intentions. The unintentional form, I argue, can often 
be communicative as well, but that it is often hidden acts with individual gains. Communicative 
resistance, I argue, is often an open form, conducted to deliver a message, for instance in chapter 
two where the food distribution was moved or where the village leaders stopped showing up at 
meetings. The reason to differentiate between these two forms is that it means something for 
the analysis of the situations and the understanding of the relation between the parties. As the 
strikes showed in chapter two, the people can gather if they want. Communicative acts, 
however, show that even though they can gather in numbers, the parties do not want the other 
parties removed as in a rebellion or a mutiny. Such acts can be highly successful, as was shown 
in the case.  
 Hidden unintentional acts, however, as Scott (1985) resistant because of their collective 
weight. As depicted in chapter three, the stealing of food does not mean simply that the person 
wants food, at the same time are saying that they do not have enough food.  This makes taking 
food necessary. This is not accomplished through one act alone but through multiple acts, such 
as was the case with kobo aridja in chapter three. Although not as effective and visible, it can 
accomplish change and is an essential aspect of the refugee's resistant actions and politics. Such 
actions are examples of friction in power relations. The prevalence of such actions can, 
however, say something about the relation between the parties.  
 The prevalence of such actions can mean that there is a lack of what I argue is 
intersubjectivity—a shared understanding of a situation. Intersubjectivity happens in what Long 
(2003) calls the interface, the meeting point between two parties that carry with them their entire 
life world. Intersubjectivity is based on the parties’ individual situation definition. However, if 
the parties do not have a similar situation definition or an understanding of each other's situation 
definition, there will be less intersubjectivity which will cause problems. The intersubjectivity 
or the lack of it means that the different parties in the settlement do not always understand each 
other's roles and power. Intersubjectivity or the lack of it is not just meant for the analysis of 
situations, but that different parties can misunderstand the complete and general roles of other 




empowerment the refugees receive through different documents and their governmentality do 
to their role. The lack of intersubjectivity, therefore, does not only mean that the parties 
misunderstand separate situations but can misunderstand the roles and power of other parties.  
 In chapter four, I catch up with the third party in the settlement, namely the host 
community. They are an empowered party in relation to the humanitarian organisations which 
maintain a lot of control within the settlement. They are empowered by the 70/30 rule, which 
states that 30 per cent of all aid given should go to the host communities. Host communities are 
therefore able to state demands from the humanitarian organisations. I argue that the three 
parties create a triangle of reciprocity. This happens through the host's act of giving land to the 
refugees, the refugees are, however, unable to reciprocate this act and so the humanitarian 
organisations do it through the 70/30 rule. The refugees are the party which receives from both 
parties as the host gives to the refugees and the humanitarian organisations give to both. As the 
host community are the owners of the land, they are the host of the refugees. I argue, however, 
that even though they are hospitable, they are also resistant and that these two forms of actions 
do not have to oppose each other. I show examples of this where, for instance, where a host 
community acts resistant towards the refugees. At the same time, it was meant as a message to 
the humanitarian organisations that they wanted to talk to them. Other actions are such as 
tricking and acting violent towards each other, while also sharing the local economy which has 
grown immensely since the refugees arrived. The host community shapes the relations in the 
settlement by being a party that has the power to demand, intervene and both give and take 
from the refugees. They shape the relations by creating friction between the different parties as 
well as being the party that facilitates friction. These actions, I argue, happens through acts of 
hospitality and resistance from their part.   
 As shown throughout the text, the relations in the settlement are power relations also in 
terms of how Foucault describes these as different parties continually acting upon other parties' 
acts. However, I also argue that as the resistant acts are dynamic, based on the roles, their power 
and the separate situations, so too are the relations. The relations between the parties are 
continuously changing while they at the same time are hinging on the roles staying the same. 
The humanitarian organisations and OPM cannot lose their role if they disappear, so will the 
refugees. As defined by international definitions, refugees have a limited rang within which 
they can operate.. However, as argued above, the refugees have already pushed the limits of the 
international understanding of a refugee by becoming empowered to the extent they have. The 
host community, however, can change a lot. Definitions or policies do not limit them. They can 




will also affect the relations within the settlement. This makes their role in time, unpredictable. 
So, attempting to answer what the relations are, is that they are dynamic power relations with 
resistant actions continuously changing, dependent on the parties power. 
 This thesis contributes to the anthropology of refugees by observing their power in their 
relations with their surrounding parties. A Focus on understanding the relations as dynamic 
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